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THE PATHOLOGIES OF BANKING BUSINESS AS
USUAL
Hilary J. Allen*
The Wolf of Wall Street’s Jordan Belfort is the latest popular culture
depiction of the “banker behaving badly” we love to hate. However, the
Jordan Belforts of the world do not cause financial crises—the reality is far
less sexy. This Article argues that financial crises are caused by ordinary
financial industry personnel engaging in everyday behavior that is not
fraudulent, but nonetheless has the potential to generate huge social
problems in the quest for short-term profits. In particular, this Article
focuses on the destabilizing potential of complex innovation and
leverage—two pathologies of banking business as usual. This Article
argues that criminal law, private litigation and command-and-control
regulation are all limited in their ability to restrain these non-fraudulent but
destabilizing behaviors, and so we must also address the prevailing “Wall
Street” culture that promotes these behaviors with little regard for their
social costs.
Many proponents of financial regulatory reform have ignored the issue
of industry culture—perhaps because the problem often seems intractable.
Instead, most reform efforts have tinkered around the edges of destabilizing
behaviors, with the tacit understanding that the industry will constantly
arbitrage regulations in an endless cat-and-mouse game. However, we
need not be entirely fatalistic about financial industry culture: there is a
large empirical literature that demonstrates that people often do make
sacrifices for the public good, and this Article is the first to use this “prosocial” literature to inform proposals for financial industry reform.
It would be pretty shallow to attribute the cultural pathologies of Wall
Street at their roots to bad people working there. The trouble, instead, is
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Thanks also go to participants in faculty workshops at Brooklyn Law School, Georgia State
University, Loyola University Chicago, Suffolk University and Tulane University, as well
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that the structural conditions of the financial industry have fostered certain
cultural norms. If you are designing policies to fix Wall Street, you need to
take into account how they will shape that culture.1
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INTRODUCTION
Our popular culture is replete with real and fictional examples of
bankers behaving badly. From Wall Street’s Gordon Gekko to The Wolf of
Wall Street’s Jordan Belfort, from Milken to Madoff, our society loves to
hate flamboyant financiers who lie, cheat and steal their way to success—
and then get their comeuppance in the form of a criminal conviction. It is
not surprising, then, that the American public is angry that none of the
bankers who caused the financial crisis of 2007–2008 (the “Financial
Crisis”) were sent to jail.2 After all, because the financial system is the
1. Jonathan Chait, Barack Obama, Ta-Nehisi Coates, Poverty and Culture, N.Y.
MAGAZINE, Mar. 19, 2014, http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2014/03/obama-ta-nehisicoates-poverty-and-culture.html.
2. See, e.g., Matt Taibbi, Why Isn’t Wall Street in Jail?, ROLLING STONE, Mar. 3,
2011, at 44, which pithily sums up the situation as “[e]verything’s [expletive], and nobody
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primary provider of credit to the broader economy,3 the failure of financial
institutions and markets during the Financial Crisis generated broader
economic recessions,4 increased unemployment, eviscerated pensions,
increased the rate of household bankruptcies, and even damaged personal
health.5 However, as this Article will explore, financial crises are caused
by behavior that is much more mundane and widespread than the flashy
frauds we see in the movies.
This is in many ways an inconvenient conclusion. It would be easier
if we could classify the individual sources of financial instability as
dishonest or untrustworthy villains—“bad apples” are relatively few and far
between, and their bad behavior is relatively easy to identify and punish. In
reality, however, financial crises result from everyday activities performed
by large swathes of the financial industry in an attempt to maximize shortterm profits. In particular, reliance on large amounts of leverage, as well as
financial innovation that exacerbates complexity—two pathologies of
banking business as usual—are rarely dishonest or sensational, but evince a
lack of concern for how society will suffer when the financial system is
destabilized. However, neither criminal law nor private litigation is
particularly adept at addressing these pathologies, and traditional financial

goes to jail” (quoting a former Senate investigator).
3. “This strong connection between financial markets and real economic activity,
particularly when financial markets cease to function, is what has made so many of the
crises . . . such spectacular historic events.” CARMEN M. REINHART & KENNETH S. ROGOFF,
THIS TIME IS DIFFERENCE: EIGHT CENTURIES OF FINANCIAL FOLLY xliv (2009). Banks are the
“backup source of liquidity to all other institutions, financial and nonfinancial.” E. Gerald
Corrigan, Summary of Are Banks Special?, FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF MINNEAPOLIS (Jan
1, 1983), available at https://www.minneapolisfed.org/publications/annual-reports/arebanks-special. “Banks enable people to borrow money, and, today, by operating electronictransfer systems, they allow commerce to take place without notes and coins changing
hands. They also play a critical role in channeling savings into productive investments. . . .
[M]any businesses rely on the banks to fund their day-to-day operations.” John Cassidy,
What Good is Wall Street?, THE NEW YORKER, Nov. 29, 2010, at 49-50.
4. The Financial Crisis spurred what has been called the “Great Recession” which
started in December 2007, and officially ended in June 2009. Even after the Great
Recession officially ended, the United States economy remained sluggish. Catherine
Rampell, The Recession Has (Officially) Ended, N.Y. TIMES BLOG (Sept. 30, 2010, 1:50
p.m.),
http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/09/20/the-recession-has-officiallyended/?_r=0.
5. See, e.g.,Mona Fiuzat et al., United States Stock Market Performance and Acute
Myocardial Infarction Rates in 2008–2009 (from the Duke Databank for Cardiovascular
Disease), 106 AM. J. CARDIOLOGY, 1545, 1545-49 (2010) (showing a correlation between
the stock market performance in 2008-2009 and heart health); Aaron Reeves et. al., Increase
in State Suicide Rates in the USA During Economic Recession, 380 THE LANCET 1813,
1813-14 (2012), available at http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0140673612
619102 (shedding light on America’s mental health problems as a consequence of the
recession).
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regulation also has its limits—if the law can’t make financial industry
personnel eschew destabilizing behaviors, then they will only do so if they
view themselves as stewards of financial stability who are willing to make
some sacrifices for the greater good. Unfortunately, while it is not
unreasonable to expect more than a purely self-interested mentality from
the financial industry—it is, after all, “a heavily subsidized industry that
carries out major quasi-governmental functions and is fully dependent on
government business and support for its current scale of operations”6—
regrettably, financial industry culture does not currently reflect the
privileged and quasi-public role that financial institutions play in society.
(This Article shall use the short-hand “failure of indirect other-regarding
behavior” to describe situations where the financial industry demonstrates a
failure of empathy by not considering the negative externalities that harm
people with whom they have no direct connection).7
This Article therefore asserts that we must also explore proposals to
reform financial industry culture. While financial industry personnel are
often considerate of others in their non-work life, more self-interested,
short-termist norms have displaced norms of indirect other-regarding
behavior in many of their workplaces.8 Part of this Article’s purpose, then,
is to explore policies that would allow the other-regarding norms that drive
individuals outside of the workplace to fulfill their promise as potential
modifiers of destabilizing behavior within the workplace. The intention is
to use a number of strategies to create a social context wherein the
prevailing norm is for financial institution personnel to give some
consideration to the negative externalities of their actions, with the
consequence that deviating from that norm for the purpose of making shortterm gains will expose the deviator to censure and opprobrium from their
peers within the firm and industry, and damage their own self-concept as
stewards for the financial system.
Of course, a more other-regarding industry culture is not a panacea for
financial stability. Individual judgments by industry personnel about what
behaviors best balance self-interest and other-regarding norms will often
differ, and given the complexity and uncertainty inherent in the financial
system, even well-intended actions will sometimes fail to create the most

6. Lawrence G. Baxter, Capture Nuances in Financial Regulation, 47 WAKE FOREST
L. REV. 537, 563 (2012); see also Mehrsa Baradaran, Banking and the Social Contract, 89
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1283, 1339 (2013).
7. For a discussion of systemic risk and instability as negative externalities, see
Howell E. Jackson, Centralization, Competition, and Privatization in Financial Regulation,
2 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 649, 671 (2001).
8. See infra text accompanying notes 35-37 (suggesting that Wall-Street culture
favors short-term profitability above all else).
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optimal conditions for financial stability.9 Despite this potential for
inconsistency and mistakes, however, there is inherent value in
“engender[ing] a culture in which firms continually question[] the impact
of their activities on others.”10 Even in the presence of cognitive errors,
destabilizing behavior is less likely when financial industry participants are
willing to consider the externalities of their actions, rather than focusing
myopically on self-interest.
As a first step towards reforming financial industry culture, this
Article explores a series of complementary reforms directed at business
schools and financial institution corporate governance (focusing
particularly on boards of directors and compliance and risk-management
functions). It also explores how financial industry self-regulation might be
harnessed to create a prevailing industry culture which values avoiding
social harm. To be clear, this Article is not arguing for complete
abnegation of self-interest by the financial industry, nor is it arguing for the
elimination of risk-taking: either outcome would be undesirable, as well as
a fool’s errand. Instead, this Article advocates for a change in culture such
that financial industry participants “behave as if [society’s] comfort and
welfare were, if not necessarily at the top of their ‘to-do’ list, still worth
consideration.”11 The proposed reforms are designed to stress the
magnitude of the benefits of financial stability for the broader public (so
that the financial industry feels that sacrifices made are worthwhile), and
increase contacts between the financial industry and the broader public (to
help erode the existing in-group versus out-group orientation that makes
the financial industry less likely to value the well-being of the broader
public).12 Some of the proposals are designed to instill a better
understanding of financial instability as a phenomenon that is at least
partially caused by the financial industry’s activities, rather than an
automatic and inevitable part of the business cycle for which the financial
industry bears no responsibility.
All of these proposals will require the buy-in of authority figures
(business school professors, financial institution board members or senior
management, as the case may be) to succeed. They are also predicated on
9. See infra text accompanying notes 155-163 (discussing the complexity of the
financial system).
10. Dan Awrey, William Blair & David Kershaw, Between Law and Markets: Is There
a Role for Culture and Ethics in Financial Regulation, (London Sch. Of Econ., Legal
Studies Working Paper No. 14/2012, 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2157588.
11. LYNN STOUT, CULTIVATING CONSCIENCE: HOW GOOD LAWS MAKE GOOD PEOPLE 7
(2010).
12. Onnig H. Dombalagian, The Expressive Synergies of the Volcker Rule, 54 B.C. L.
REV. 469, 498 (2013); Cristie L. Ford, Toward a New Model for Securities Law
Enforcement, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 757, 763 (2005).
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the understanding that it is both possible and appropriate for the actions of
financial sector personnel to be informed by more than just self-interest.
As such, accepting the value of this Article’s proposals entails at least a
partial rejection of the “self-interest” part of the neoclassical economic
assumption that all persons act only to maximize rational self-interest. To
this end, this Article relies on the wealth of empirical research that supports
the existence of a universal norm of indirect other-regarding behavior that
directs us to consider the effects of our actions on others beyond our
immediate counterparties.13 In cultures as varied as “Orma cattle herders in
Kenya” and “Lamalara whale-hunters in Indonesia”, researchers have
found that people will sometimes make sacrifices for the greater good,14
and the expectation that people will empathize with the plight of others,
and refrain from harming others, is even stronger than the expectation that
people will actively assist others.15 That is not to say that self-interest is
irrelevant to people’s motivations—only that people are often willing to
make small sacrifices for the greater good. If the sacrifice demanded is too
large, however, self-interest is likely to carry the day.16 As such, while the
reforms proposed in this Article are conceptually separate from proposals
that have been made to align the incentives of financial institution
personnel with the interests of the public in long-term stability (these
incentive-based proposals appeal entirely to the actor’s self-interest), the
two types of proposals are necessarily complementary. Incentives must be
structured such that there is not too much personal cost involved in
avoiding the pathologies of banking business as usual: cultural reform is
more apt for the fine-tuning of behaviors once there are no longer
overwhelming incentives to act in a particular poor way.
The remainder of this Article will proceed as follows. Section I will
explore in more detail the pathologies of banking business as usual. It
considers two particularly important pathologies in the abstract—namely,
the use of leverage, and certain types of complexity-inducing financial
innovation—as well as utilizes more concrete examples from the Financial
Crisis, and the more recent scandal relating to JPMorgan’s “London
13. Coughlin notes that “[t]he socio-economic literature is replete with examples of
how models that assume the pursuit of narrow self-interest simply do not work as well as
those that provide a more complete and more realistic portrayal of human motivation.”
Richard M. Coughlin, Whose Morality? Which Community? What Interests? Socioeconomic and Communitarian Perspectives, 25 J. SOCIO-ECONOMICS 135, 140 (1996).
Much of this research is summarized in STOUT, supra note 11, at 75-93.
14. The research on other-regarding behavior recognizes that incentives play a role in
driving behavior, although it contradicts the assumption that we only ever act to maximize
self-interest. STOUT, supra note 11 at 82.
15. Zak, infra note 21, at 267; Solomon, infra note 24, at 20.
16. STOUT, supra note 11, at 99.
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Whale” trading losses, to explain how behavior that is self-interested, but
stops short of fraud, is the usual culprit in times of financial instability.
Section II explores a range of business school and institutional governance
reforms designed to inculcate a more other-regarding culture in the
financial industry. Section III emphasizes the need for such cultural reform
by demonstrating that strategies typically used to combat financial
misconduct—including criminal prosecution and private litigation—are illsuited to addressing non-fraudulent destabilizing behaviors. Section III
also explores the limitations of command-and-control regulation
(particularly its susceptibility to arbitrage), and the difficulties inherent in
precisely aligning the incentives of the financial industry with society’s
interests in financial stability. While rules and incentives remain important
tools for engendering financial stability, this Article argues that they should
be complemented by policies that promote cultural reform.
I.

THE PATHOLOGIES OF BANKING BUSINESS AS USUAL

Broadly speaking, two meta-narratives have emerged as explanations
for the Financial Crisis. One narrative sees the Crisis as the confluence of
appropriately self-interested actions by individuals who were simply
confounded by complexity and cognitive failures17: buyers and sellers of
financial products all failed to appreciate the risks that were being taken in
the lead up to—and eventually precipitated—the Financial Crisis. This
first account of the Crisis asserts that destabilizing behaviors were
problematic, but cannot be addressed by cultural reform (and should not be
punished) because they resulted from purely cognitive errors with no
attendant moral culpability.18 Counterpoised against this first narrative is
the “moral failure” narrative, which asserts that the institutions buying and
selling financial products did appreciate the risks that were being taken in
the lead-up to the Crisis, but were happy to maximize their own selfinterest by consciously duping their counterparties.19
This Article argues for a middle path—neither cognitive nor moral
failures should be considered in isolation. While it is true that market
participants will never have perfect information or be able to make perfect
decisions about something as complex as the financial system,20 it is also

17. Arnold Kling, The Financial Crisis: Moral Failure or Cognitive Failure?, 33
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 507, 507-09 (2010); Donald C. Langevoort, Chasing the Greased
Pig Down Wall Street: A Gatekeeper’s Guide to the Psychology, Culture, and Ethics of
Financial Risk Taking, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 1209, 1210 (2011).
18. Kling, supra note 17, at 507-09.
19. Langevoort, supra note 17, at 1210-11.
20. Id. at 1210.

ARTICLE 4 (ALLEN).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

868

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

6/16/15 11:49 AM

[Vol. 17:3

true that they will rarely be entirely ignorant of what is going on in that
system. Instead, market participants will usually be making partially
informed decisions, and some type of moral judgment will need to
supplement that decision-making in order to fill the informational and
cognitive void.21 In particular, moral norms function as a lens through
which information is viewed and assessed—risks are sometimes
underappreciated as unimportant, not only because the decision-maker had
difficulty comprehending those risks, but also because the consequences of
those risks would be borne largely by other people if they came to
fruition.22 Moral and cognitive failures are thus intertwined, and must be
analyzed as such.
This Article seeks to explain how the moral and cognitive failures of
the financial industry intertwine to generate financial instability. In order
to do so, it must engage with a preliminary under-theorized question: what
precisely is meant by “moral norms” and “morality” in the financial
stability context? There is not just one normative standard that governs the
behavior of the financial industry: as Jodi Short has identified, “[c]orporate
financial conduct . . . is subject to multiple and potentially conflicting
normative systems.”23 This Article therefore takes on the task of unpacking
some of the moral normative systems that currently apply to Wall Street
personnel. While there are centuries of religious and philosophical
literature that explore the boundaries of morality, this Article will leave
such religious and philosophical debates to those better qualified to engage
in them.24 Instead, this Article is informed by ethnographical research on
21. “[M]orals are not a creation of reason, but a second tradition independent from the
tradition of reason, which helps us adapt to problems which exceed by far the limits of our
capacity of rational perception”. Paul J. Zak, Values and Value: Moral Economics, in
MORAL MARKETS: THE CRITICAL ROLE OF VALUES IN THE ECONOMY, 259, 259 (Paul J. Zak
ed., 2008) (quoting Friedrich von Hayek); see also Susan A. Bandes, Emotions and Risk
Regulation, in 62 STUDIES IN LAW, POLITICS, AND SOCIETY 219, 220 (Bettina Lange et al.
eds., 2013).
22. In the behavioral economics literature, this is known as “incentive bias”: “In this
case, the actor knows or has good reason to know that the facts are a certain way, but
deliberately ignores the facts, suppresses information, or distorts analysis out of a conscious
intention to promote the actor’s own interests.” Geoffrey P. Miller & Gerald Rosenfeld,
Intellectual Hazard: How Conceptual Biases in Complex Organizations Contributed to the
Crisis of 2008, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 807, 817 (2010).
23. Jodi L. Short, Competing Normative Frameworks and the Limits of Deterrence
Theory: Comments on Baker and Griffith’s Ensuring Corporate Misconduct, 38 LAW &
SOC. INQUIRY 493, 501 (2013).
24. Some scholars have evinced a distaste for confusing the religious aspects of
morality with law: there is a sense, for some, that “to make a personal statement about the
immorality of a particular type of securities transaction is to confuse oneself with God.”
John H. Walsh, A Simple Code of Ethics: A History of the Moral Purpose Inspiring Federal
Regulation of the Securities Industry, 29 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1015 (2001) (discussing Manne’s
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the norms that are particular to and prevalent in the financial industry,25 as
well as a large body of empirical research by ethnographers,
anthropologists and neuroscientists on moral norms that tend to apply
universally around the world and across cultures.26 People tend to feel
ashamed when they violate the moral norms that exist in their culture, and
as such, these universal moral norms can be powerful regulators of
behavior, even in the absence of formal enforcement mechanisms.27
Research on universal moral norms has identified that humans
generally expect compliance with norms relating to recognition of property
rights and prohibitions on murder, rape and certain other forms of
violence.28 There are also certain universal moral norms that are highly
salient to financial regulation. One is honesty,29 and a broad literature has
emerged that explores how honesty is essential to economic interactions
between people.30 Another universal moral norm that is highly salient to—
but almost entirely unexplored in the context of—financial regulation, is
the norm of indirect other-regarding behavior.31 This norm directs us to
consider the effects of our actions on others beyond our immediate
counterparties (in economic parlance, the externalities of our actions), as
work). However, morality need not be religious: there is a long tradition of moral
philosophy outside of the religious traditions, incorporating the works of Aristotle, Hobbes,
Adam Smith, Hume, Kant, and Rawls, to name just a few. See Robert C. Solomon, Free
Enterprise, Sympathy and Virtue, in MORAL MARKETS: THE CRITICAL ROLE OF VALUES IN
THE ECONOMY, supra note 22, at 16 (providing a reasonably brief review of the views of
these thinkers, in the context of corporations and free enterprise).
25. KAREN HO, LIQUIDATED: AN ETHNOGRAPHY OF WALL STREET (2009).
26. Lynn A. Stout, Taking Conscience Seriously, in MORAL MARKETS: THE CRITICAL
ROLE OF VALUES IN THE ECONOMY, supra note 21, at 157, 162 [hereinafter Stout, MORAL
MARKETS]; Zak, supra note 21, at 259, 273.
27. Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 909
(1996)
28. Stout, MORAL MARKETS, supra note 26, at 162.
29. “The norms embodied in this legal regime include honesty, fair dealing, and
investor protection.” Short, supra note 23, at 501.
30. See, e.g., TAMAR FRANKEL, TRUST AND HONESTY: AMERICA’S BUSINESS CULTURE
AT A CROSSROAD (2006) (arguing that the lack of trust and honesty in the financial industry
has detrimental consequences on the economy and suggesting that Americans can reverse
the trend by “demand[ing] of their leaders and of each other more honesty and less
cynicism, more trust and less doubting”).
31. “Even with spatial and temporal distance, others’ emotions are felt in ourselves and
influence our behavior.” Zak, supra note 21, at 267; “Universal moral values . . . reflect . . .
direct concern for the concrete welfare of other living, breathing humans in one’s
community. At this level, morality is both an important concept and a widely shared one.”
Stout, MORAL MARKETS, supra note 26, at 163. This more expansive notion of indirect
other-regarding behavior becomes particularly important when people have no choice as to
participation in a system: they can choose not to deal with people they deem dishonest or
untrustworthy, but it is much more difficult to opt out of an entire financial system and
economy that are callous to their needs.
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opposed to the norm of honesty, which tends to be assessed by its impact
on others with whom we have some type of direct connection (i.e. honest
people tell the truth to others).32
Honesty is recognized as being essential to economic interactions: if
an actor is perceived to be lacking in honesty, others will not have the
confidence to engage in transactions with that actor without expensive
verification mechanisms.33 While these increased transaction costs are
certainly important for individual transactions, they can also become
significant from a systemic perspective when instances of dishonest
behavior become so prevalent (or are perceived to have become so
prevalent) that transaction costs are increased for everyone, even where
both counterparties are honest. In such a systemic context, failure to think
more expansively about externalities (in this case, the increased transaction
costs for “others” resulting from a systemic lack of confidence precipitated
by one’s dishonest actions)34 violates the norm of indirect other-regarding
behavior.
Regrettably, this norm of indirect other-regarding behavior appears to
have been displaced, or at least to have mutated, in the prevailing culture of
Wall Street today.35 One landmark ethnographic study of Wall Street
institutions has found that the employees of such institutions are motivated
almost entirely by short-term profits,36 which “generat[es] pressure to . . .
ignore the societal impact of their risk-taking.”37 This does not necessarily
demonstrate a complete lack of concern for everyone: to the extent that
risky behavior drives up short-term institutional profits, it could be said to

32. Tamar Frankel, Trust, Honesty and Ethics in Business, 31-32 FIN. & COMMON
GOOD (BIEN COMMUN) 87, 88 (2008), http://www.tamarfrankel.com/supportfiles/financeandcommongood.pdf.
33. Ronald J. Colombo, The Role of Trust in Financial Regulation, 55 VILL. L. REV.
577, 579 (2010).
34. James A. Fanto, Surveillant and Counselor: A Reorientation in Compliance for
Financial Firms 20 (Brooklyn Law Sch. Legal Studies, Working Paper No. 358, 2013),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2321317.
35. Cultures can evolve in ways that suppress universal moral norms like empathy and
guilt. Frankel, supra note 32, at 89.
36. Karen Ho’s ethnography of Wall Street bankers depicts an industry that has a laserlike focus on short-term market movements, rather than on long-term consequences for
those outside of the markets. (cited in Langevoort, supra note 17, at 1233). More recently,
an independent report on Barclays found that “[t]he culture that emerged [at the bank]
tended to favor transactions over relationships, the short term over sustainability and
financial over other business purposes.” Mark Scott, Report Faults ‘at All Costs’ Attitude at
Barclays That Encouraged Risk, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 2013, at B2, available at
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/04/03/report-faults-at-all-costs-attitude-at-barclays
(quoting Anthony Salz, former head of the law firm Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer).
37. Awrey et al., supra note 10, at 20.
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be aligned with norms of promoting shareholder value38 (although there is a
strong case that diversified financial institution shareholders are better
served by financial stability than by outsized profits from those financial
institutions).39 Members of the financial industry often demonstrate
concern for their peers within the industry as well.40 However, when
financial industry personnel engage in risky behavior for the single-minded
purpose of increasing short-term profits, this evinces a lack of regard for
people who are neither their peers nor shareholders in the financial
institution, but who will (in the form of lost jobs and eviscerated retirement
funds) bear the brunt of any financial instability caused by that institution.41
To be clear, it is not the risk-taking in and of itself that is objectionable
(after all, the financial industry came into being for the purpose of
facilitating the prudent taking and managing of risks). Instead, Wall Street
behavior diverges from norms of indirect other-regarding behavior in its
failure to consider the negative externalities of its risk-taking—particularly
the consequences for those who have no direct relationship with the
institution in question.
A. Complexity and Leverage
This Part will explore the process of financial innovation, and the use
of very high leverage: two important examples of financial activities that
generate large profits in the short-term, but which pose potentially huge
problems for financial stability. Whilst some amount of innovation, and
some level of leverage, is integral to the proper functioning of the financial
system, it is difficult to delineate in advance the ideal amounts of each.
Innovation can facilitate broader economic growth by improving capital
intermediation and risk management,42 and some level of leverage is
38. “A second normative system governing behavior in the contemporary corporation
is the maximization of shareholder value, narrowly conceived as wealth and often
operationalized as short-term, quarter-to-quarter gains.” Short, supra note 23, at 501.
However, the quest for short-term profits can also be viewed more cynically as a pure
promotion of personal self-interest. Id. at 504.
39. See infra note 199 and accompanying text (arguing that diversified shareholders are
harmed more by systemic events than lower institutional profits).
40. If a culture evolves so that a person’s peer group endorses their act, even if it
violates broader social norms, then that person is more likely to be comfortable breaching
those norms. Sunstein, supra note 27, at 940.
41. “[T]he pain [resulting from financial instability] usually does not fall
proportionately on those who made the mistakes in the first place”. Stephen B. Young,
Moral Capitalism and the Great Financial Meltdown of 2008, 33 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF.
129, 139 (2009).
42. Hilary J. Allen, A New Philosophy For Financial Stability Regulation, 45 LOY. U.
CHI. L.J. 173, 218-19 (2013) [hereinafter Allen, New Philosophy].
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essential to financial institutions’ abilities to provide liquidity and
intermediate capital.43 But excessive amounts of either activity can
destabilize our financial system.
Financial innovation is potentially problematic because of its
contribution to the increasing complexity of the financial system. This
complexity renders the system increasingly opaque to reasoned human
cognition, making it more difficult to make thoughtful judgments about
where risk lies. Furthermore, the numerous linkages between financial
institutions and products function as feedback loops that can speed up and
amplify the transmission of shocks throughout the financial system.44 This
increased speed further hampers the exercise of reasoned human judgment,
necessitating reliance on shortcuts like cognitive heuristics and computer
models, which tend to dismiss low-probability but high-consequence tail
risks.45 Thus, when something unanticipated goes wrong (which may be as
innocent as a fat finger error) the shock can reverberate through the system
before anyone (regulators or market participants) can exercise reasoned
human judgment about how to respond. In place of reasoned judgment,
correlated reliance on similar shortcuts can lead to the panicked herd
behavior (particularly the destructive fire sales of financial assets) that
precipitates financial instability.46
Innovation of complex new financial products thus poses risks for
financial stability.47 This is so even when the institutions that develop these
products honestly disclose the inherent risks to investors: the new products

43. RICHARD SCOTT CARNELL, JONATHAN R. MACEY & GEOFFREY P. MILLER, THE LAW
OF BANKING AND FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 40 (5th ed. 2013).
44. Allen, New Philosophy, supra note 42, at 218-19. This is particularly the case
when there is a long chain of intermediaries involved, which increases reliance on shortterm funding (each link in the chain must use increasingly cheaper funding to make the
transaction viable, and funding generally becomes cheaper when it is short-term, because of
the lowered chance that something can go wrong in the brief period of exposure). Increased
reliance on short-term funding renders the financial system more fragile. Kathryn Judge,
Intermediary Influence, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015).
45. “Individuals tend to ignore low probability catastrophic events.” Henry T.C. Hu,
Misunderstood Derivatives: The Causes of Informational Failure and the Promise of
Regulatory Incrementalism, 102 YALE L.J. 1457, 1488 (1993). This very human tendency is
exacerbated by over-reliance on computer-based mathematical models like “Value at Risk”
or “VaR”, which tend to downplay tail risks. See generally Erik F. Gerding, Code, Crash,
and Open Source: The Outsourcing of Financial Regulation to Risk Models and the Global
Financial Crisis, 84 WASH. L. REV. 127 (2009).
46. Allen, New Philosophy, supra note 42, at 219.
47. “In today’s financial marketplace, the biggest and potentially least understood
systemic risks come from large-scale trading in highly complex derivatives, structured
products, and other instruments of risk transfer used for sophisticated speculation and
arbitrage.” Saule T. Omarova, Wall Street as Community of Fate: Toward Financial
Industry Self-Regulation, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 411, 478 (2011).
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still add complexity and interconnectedness to the financial system,
increasing the amount and obscuring the allocation of risk in the system as
a whole.48 Some take the position that this is the necessary price to be paid
for progress,49 but in fact there are many reasons to be skeptical of the
benefits of financial innovation: innovation often serves the short-term
interests of the firms who supply the innovations, rather than addressing
any genuine societal needs for improved capital intermediation and/or risk
management functions.50 To the extent that financial institutions develop
complex financial products with little social utility in order to generate
large fees (particularly when these products are rushed out without full
appreciation of the risks they entail), financial innovation can be viewed as
a failure of indirect other-regarding behavior. There is a similar failure if
an unnecessarily complex innovation has been engineered in order to
confuse regulators, or to arbitrage regulatory requirements. Despite being
undesirable, however, such innovations are by no means illegal.51
Financial innovations are often developed as a way of introducing new
and unregulated types of leverage into the system.52 When financial
institutions rely heavily on leverage,53 it increases their profits in good
times, but makes them very vulnerable to external shocks. If such a shock
occurs, highly-leveraged institutions will likely need to sell their assets
quickly,54 and this can depress asset prices system-wide, forcing other
institutions to also deleverage by selling their assets (Brunnermeier has
described this vicious cycle as a “fire sale externality”).55 Falling asset

48. Allen, New Philosophy, supra note 42, at 218-21.
49. See, e.g., ROBERT E. LITAN, THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, IN DEFENSE OF MUCH,
BUT NOT ALL, FINANCIAL INNOVATION (Feb. 17, 2010), available at
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2010/2/17%20financial%20innovat
ion%20litan/0217_financial_innovation_litan.pdf.
50. Dan Awrey, Complexity, Innovation, and the Regulation of Modern Financial
Markets, 2 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 235, 262 (2012).
51. Regulatory arbitrage is “a perfectly legal planning technique used to avoid . . .
regulatory costs.” Victor Fleischer, Regulatory Arbitrage, 89 TEX. L. REV. 227, 229 (2010).
52. See, e.g., Geanakoplos’ discussion of how the innovation of the credit default swap
created a new and almost limitless source of leverage in the financial system. John
Geanakoplos, The Leverage Cycle, 24 NBER MACROECONOMICS ANN. 2009, 1, 6 (2009).
53. The less equity funding used to fund activities, the higher the debt funding and thus
the higher the leverage. Andrew W. Lo & Thomas J. Brennan, Do Labyrinthine Legal
Limits on Leverage Lessen the Likelihood of Losses? An Analytical Framework, 90 TEX. L.
REV. 1775, 1780 (2012).
54. “As different managers experience similar effects, they are likely to react in the
same way by each selling assets, causing greater price volatility and prompting further sales.
The result is a cascading decline in value, with greater coordination impairing each firm’s
ability to manage its own risk exposure.” Charles K. Whitehead, Destructive Coordination,
96 CORNELL L. REV. 323, 326-27 (2011).
55. Markus K. Brunnermeier, Deciphering the Liquidity and Credit Crunch 2007-
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prices can damage confidence and cause financial institutions to become
insolvent—with broad consequences for the availability of credit and
payment systems to the economy as a whole.56
Given these externalized costs of high leverage and instability, society
is best served by financial institutions reducing their leverage profile. To
this end, international regulatory capital standards (the most recent iteration
of which is known as “Basel III”) have been developed that require banks
to maintain a minimum amount of equity (as opposed to debt) funding.57
Basel III’s standards are complicated, but essentially they require banks to
fund a minimum amount of their “risk-weighted assets” with equity or
equity-like instruments, which are better able to absorb losses than debt.58
Banks are able to arbitrage these regulatory capital rules, though, to allow
them to hold lower amounts of equity than are required by the “spirit” of
Basel III. For example, over the years banks have innovated new products
like trust preferred securities and contingent convertible bonds to satisfy
regulatory capital requirements, notwithstanding that these innovative
instruments are inferior to common equity in their ability to absorb any
losses that the issuing financial institution may incur.59 In addition,
different types of non-bank institutions (often referred to as “shadow
banks”) have evolved since the advent of regulatory capital rules that
provide banking-like services without having to comply with Basel III’s
standards.60
The banks that are required to comply with Basel III can also arbitrage
those standards by manipulating the way they calculate their risk-weighted
assets. A bank can transfer its assets “off-balance sheet” so that they are
excluded from its calculation of risk-weighted assets, or a bank can use
proprietary internal models to assign low risk-weightings to its assets.61
These techniques allow banks to report that they have fewer assets, with
lower risk-weightings, which allows them to fund themselves with more
2008, 23 J. OF ECON. PERSP. 77, 94 (2009).
56. Allen, New Philosophy, supra note 48, at 183.
57. BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, BASEL III:
A GLOBAL REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR MORE RESILIENT BANKS AND BANKING SYSTEMS
(2011).
58. The Basel III international standards on capital adequacy (which are in the process
of being implemented in most advanced economies) effectively require banks to fund at
least 7.0% of their risk-weighed assets with common equity, and to fund another 3.5% of
their risk weighted assets with equity-like instruments. There are more stringent
requirements for global systemically important banks. Id. at 27-28.
59. Hilary J. Allen, Let’s Talk About Tax: Fixing Bank Incentives to Sabotage Stability,
18 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 821, 844-866 (2013) [hereinafter Allen, Let’s Talk About
Tax].
60. Id. at 882-83.
61. Id. at 832.
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debt and less equity and thus increase their leverage (the amount of equity
funding required is expressed as a percentage of risk-weighted assets).62
Doing so is rarely fraudulent: because accounting methodologies and the
attribution of risk to highly complex, often illiquid, financial assets are
inherently subjective, and reflect the combined judgments of many
different people working in a financial institution, it is very difficult to say
that the results are not plausibly honest. However, even though this type of
arbitrage is legal, if a lack of concern for how others might be affected by
the fruition of an institution’s risks results in consistently low reports of
risk-weighted assets (and thus minimizes the amount of equity that the
institution has available to absorb losses), then this evinces a failure of
indirect other-regarding behavior.63
B. The Pathologies of the Financial Crisis
Unnecessarily high complexity and leverage, as well as some other
failures of indirect other-regarding behavior, were key drivers of the
Financial Crisis. This Part will illustrate this idea with actual examples
from the Financial Crisis. However, this Part will start by examining
someone who did not cause the Financial Crisis: Bernie Madoff. Many
people invested with Madoff in the years before the Financial Crisis,
trusting that he was an honest money manager producing reasonable (if
somewhat implausibly consistent) returns.64 When Madoff could no longer
attract new investors during the Financial Crisis, it became apparent that he
was operating a Ponzi scheme, and that he had defrauded investors of an
estimated $64.8 billion.65 Madoff was charged with eleven felony counts,
including securities, mail and wire fraud; he subsequently pled guilty to all

62. Vanessa Le Leslé and Sofiya Avramova, Revisiting Risk-Weighted Assets 7 (IMF
Working Paper 12/90, 2012).
63. It should also be noted that while the Basel III standards are helpful, they do not
come close to eliminating the externalities caused by financial institution leverage. Basel III
does not apply to most non-bank financial institutions, and even when it comes to banks,
many economists dispute that the minimum levels of equity funding mandated by Basel III
are sufficient. For example, Admati and twenty other prominent economists have argued
that banks should be required to fund at least 15% of their total (i.e. not risk-weighted)
assets with common equity. Admati et al., Healthy Banking System is the Goal, Not
Profitable Banks, FINANCIAL TIMES, Nov. 9, 2010, available at, http://www.ft.com/intl/
cms/s/0/63fa6b9e-eb8e-11df-bbb5-00144feab49a.html#axzz3PtCHWUlj.
Given the
limitations of the Basel III standards, society is largely forced to depend on financial
institutions’ own judgments about what level of leverage is appropriate, and instability is
much more likely if those judgments are entirely self-interested.
64. Felicia Smith, Madoff Ponzi Scheme Exposes the Myth of the Sophisticated
Investor, 40 U. BALT. L. REV. 215, 229 (2010).
65. Id. at 226.
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charges, and was sentenced to 150 years in prison for his dishonest and
criminal behavior.66
While Madoff’s failures of honesty and
trustworthiness were devastating for those who had invested with him, they
did not really compromise the stability of the financial system more
broadly.67 At worst, Madoff’s fund—and the numerous other Ponzi
schemes that have come to light in the last few years—may have
contributed to a general sense that the financial markets were unfair and
therefore not deserving of confidence,68 but these Ponzi schemes can more
accurately be described as being exposed by financial instability, rather
than causing it.
The sheer scope of the Financial Crisis suggests that it could not have
been caused entirely by the actions of a few “bad apples.”69 Instead, the
actions that caused the greatest harm in the Financial Crisis were in many
cases not fraudulent (or if they were fraudulent, the real harm that they
caused went far beyond harm to the people who were deceived and
cheated). The more plausible narrative of the Financial Crisis is that the
financial industry had a self-interested culture that encouraged many
people, who would probably consider themselves very honest and
trustworthy,70 to disregard the externalities of their actions. This point is
perhaps best illustrated by considering the mortgage-backed securitization
(“MBS”) bubble that precipitated the Financial Crisis.
66. Id.at 215, 221-22.
67. Indeed neither Madoff’s nor any other Ponzi scheme even rates a mention in the
FCIC Report on the causes of the Financial Crisis. That is not to say that the failure of
Madoff’s fund did not cause any negative externalities: in particular, many universities and
non-profit organizations were devastated by losses resulting from Madoff’s fraud. Id. at
232. The point being made is that the externalities caused by interruptions to university and
non-profit activities did not include any consequences for financial stability.
68. Id. at 231.
69. Persaud notes that “We must continue to clamp down on fraud and ethical abuses
and promote transparency, but this is not enough to avoid crises.” Avinash Persaud, MacroPrudential Regulation: Fixing Fundamental Market (and Regulatory) Failures, CRISIS
RESPONSE (The World Bank Grp., Wash., D.C.), July 2009, at 7, available at
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTFINANCIALSECTOR/Resources/2828841303327122200/Note6.pdf. In a similar vein, Coffee has stated in relation to the Enron
scandal that “No doubt, there were some rogues and some particularly bad boards. Yet the
most reliable evidence, when properly read, suggests that Enron and related scandals were
neither unique nor idiosyncratic; rather, pervasive problems arose that undercut existing
systems of corporate governance.” Symposium, What Caused Enron? A Capsule Social and
Economic History of the 1990s, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 269, 270 (2004).
70. “Personal greed perhaps, a lack of sufficient scrutiny of the company’s affairs, an
insensitivity or an indifference to public opinion, these charges could be leveled against
some corporate leaders, but few, thankfully, are guilty of deliberate fraud or wickedness. At
worst they were only playing the game according to the rules as they understood them.”
Charles Handy, What’s a Business For?, in MORAL MARKETS: THE CRITICAL ROLE OF
VALUES IN THE ECONOMY 329 (Paul J. Zak ed., 2008).
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In the late 1990s, the market for non-traditional residential mortgages
began to grow in earnest.71 Mortgage lenders engaged mortgage brokers to
market these non-traditional mortgages to borrowers, but the mortgage
brokers were in no way incentivized to ensure that borrowers could repay
their mortgages. In fact, they were often rewarded through use of a
commission known as a “yield spread premium” to steer borrowers towards
more expensive mortgages.72 The mortgage lenders were unconcerned
about the borrowers’ ability to repay, because those lenders did not retain
any of the risk that the mortgages might default: the mortgages were
immediately sold to Wall Street firms (which relied heavily on leverage to
purchase these and other assets). The Wall Street firms were unconcerned
about underwriting standards for the mortgages, because they immediately
packaged the mortgages into complex MBSs and then sold them to
investors.73 Even when Wall Street firms kept MBSs on their books, they
were still unconcerned about the quality of the underlying mortgages
because they had engineered the MBSs (and layered credit default swaps
on top of them) in a way that purported to reduce—or even eliminate—the
default risk inherent in the individual underlying mortgages.74
Because the real risks inherent in these MBSs were obscured by
complex financial engineering (and because regulators acquiesced in the
view that MBSs were not risky investments), investors were not
compensated for the risk they were acquiring, and the securities were
“over-issued relative to what would be possible under rational
expectations.”75 The demand for MBSs generated demand for more and
more mortgages, with the result that mortgages were issued to even riskier
borrowers who did not necessarily understand the terms of the exotic
mortgages they were entering into, and who (in many cases) could not hope
to be able to repay the mortgages if the values of their homes were to fall.
This drove up real estate prices, and made the MBSs backed by those
mortgages even riskier. This securitization process thus inflated both a real
estate bubble and a bubble in MBSs themselves, and there were systemic
reverberations when these bubbles popped, precipitating the Financial
Crisis. In particular, the markets lost confidence in financial institutions
71. These mortgages included subprime mortgages for borrowers with weak credit, and
for all types of borrowers, riskier mortgages with exotic features that allowed for negative
amortization. FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT 88, 102
(2011) [hereinafter, the “FCIC Report”].
72. Id. at 90.
73. Kathleen C. Engel and Patricia A. McCoy, Turning a Blind Eye: Wall Street
Finance of Predatory Lending, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2039, 2040-41 (2007).
74. FCIC Report, supra note 71, at 42-35.
75. Nicola Gennaioli, Andrei Shleifer and & Robert Vishny, Neglected Risks,
Financial Innovation, and Financial Fragility, 104 J. FIN. ECON. 452, 454 (2012).
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that had large exposure to MBSs (or to credit default swaps used to hedge
exposure to MBSs), like Lehman Brothers, Bear Stearns, Citibank, and
AIG. Because these firms relied so heavily on short-term debt to fund their
usual operations, once they lost the confidence of their funders, they
quickly lost the ability to carry on business. The U.S. Government then
stepped in to assist these institutions (with the notable exception of Lehman
Brothers), but was unable to inspire confidence sufficient to immediately
restore the normal workings of the financial system. The result was a
credit crunch that stalled broader economic growth.
So which moral failings were at work here?76 Individual mortgage
brokers who marketed predatory loans did have personal relationships with
potential mortgagors, and they abused the trust reposed in them when they
engaged in dishonest sales tactics that hid risks from those mortgagors.77
These types of behaviors could therefore properly be characterized as
fraudulent, and they have often been the subject of criminal sanctions and
private lawsuits.78 But not only did many brokers disregard the interests of
those they dealt with directly, they also disregarded the impact of their
activities on society more broadly. In fact, by marketing these predatory
loans, mortgage brokers were artificially inflating home prices, thereby
fuelling a destabilizing asset bubble that would eventually hurt everyone
when it popped. However, it is quite plausible that most mortgage brokers
did not comprehend the systemic harm that their activities, when
aggregated with similar behavior by other mortgage brokers, might do to
financial stability more generally. If it is true that mortgage brokers did not
understand the impact of their activities on society more broadly, then we
cannot characterize their actions as a failure of indirect other-regarding
behavior – in such an instance, it is fair to say that there is a pure cognitive
failure rather than any moral failure.79
While it would be harder for the Wall Street firms, which made the
mortgages and packaged them into MBSs,80 to assert that they were
76. While this Article is focused on the financial industry’s contribution to instability,
the U.S. federal financial regulatory agencies should not entirely escape blame for the MBS
bubble. See Part IV.C infra (discussing how financial regulators failed to take steps that
might have mitigated the Crisis).
77. Kevin T. Jackson, The Scandal Beneath the Financial Crisis: Getting a View from
a Moral-Cultural Mental Model, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 735, 762 (2010).
78. The Department of Justice has made available on its website a sample of
documents relating to civil and criminal mortgage fraud prosecutions. See, e.g., Sample
Documents, U.S. ATTORNEY’S OFFICE E. DIST. PA., http://www.justice.gov/usao/pae/
Mortgage_Task_Force/sampledocs.html (last visited May 9, 2015).
79. Where there is a purely cognitive failure, changing cultural norms to encourage
more other-regarding behavior will have no impact.
80. By the time of the Financial Crisis, many of the lenders that made the mortgage
loans had been subsumed into Wall Street conglomerates. FCIC Report, supra note 71, at
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completely ignorant of the potential externalities of their actions, it is
nonetheless true that many on Wall Street underappreciated the risks
inherent in MBSs. This was in large part a result, however, of a conscious
strategy by these same Wall Street firms to create opaquely complex
financial products (MBSs had been specifically engineered as securities
with only a low probability of default, and humans have a natural tendency
to underestimate the risk—often referred to as “tail risk”—of lowprobability, but potentially high-impact, events).81 Furthermore, many did
try to alert Wall Street to the problems with MBSs: voices warned about
the securitization bubble prior to the Financial Crisis,82 and significant short
positions were taken against MBSs (and securities backed by other, more
complex assets connected with the mortgage markets).83 The problem was
that these warnings about financial instability were largely ignored, in part
because of moral failings. The financial industry’s desire for short-term
profits, and disregard for externalities borne by those outside of the
financial system, ensured that the MBS machine continued to churn on
even when there were clear warnings of the MBS market’s destabilizing
potential.
Wall Street’s attitude was epitomized by a new acronym “IBGYBG”
(short for “I’ll be gone, you’ll be gone”), coined in the heat of the MBS
bubble to describe deals that “brought in big fees up front while risking
much larger losses in the future.”84 This lack of moral compunction with
respect to the MBS market was also on display in a quote from Armand
Pastine, a Managing Director of a CDO issuer, reported in May of 2005: he
stated, “[t]o suggest that CDO managers would pull out of an economically
viable deal for moral reasons — that’s a cop-out ”.85 That Pastine
repudiated morality does not mean that he was not also affected by

88-89.
81. See supra note 45 (citing materials for the proposition that individuals tend to
ignore low probability catastrophic events).
82. Engel & McCoy, supra note 73; Raghuram G. Rajan, Has Financial Development
Made the World Riskier?, in THE GREENSPAN ERA: LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE, A SYMPOSIUM
SPONSORED BY THE FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY, JACKSON HOLE, WYOMING,
AUGUST 25-27, 2005 (Alan Greenspan ed., Fed. Reserve Bank of Kan. City 2005).
83. See Michael Lewis, THE BIG SHORT: INSIDE THE DOOMSDAY MACHINE (2010)
(presenting an extremely entertaining account of the people who bet against the MBS
bubble).
84. FCIC Report, supra note 71, at 8.
85. Allison Pyburn, CDO Investors Debate Morality of Spread Environment, ASSET
SECURITIZATION REPORT, May 9, 2005, at 1. It should be noted, though, that there were
some bond managers who took “the high road . . . .” PIMCO, for example, announced that
it would withdraw from the MBS market because the rates being paid on bonds were
insufficient to compensate investors for the risk inherent in such bonds, given the lack of
historical performance data for subprime mortgages, and credit ratings that were too lax. Id.
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cognitive failures. In a statement ripe with hubris, Pastine also noted his
(disastrously incorrect) view that “some of the investors are
underestimating the stamina and resiliency of the residential mortgage
market in the U.S. — particularly in light of the new products available to
more residential consumers along the entire credit spectrum.”86
Nonetheless, Pastine’s complete disregard for morality in the context of
financial business is indicative of a broader cultural issue. He, and many
others, thought it was preposterous to even consider the moral implications
of mortgage-backed securitization.
Admittedly, when Pastine was quoted in May of 2005, the MBS
bubble had reached such frenzied proportions that the profits to be made by
participating would have been difficult to give up, even if industry
personnel had felt some moral disquiet about the danger the bubble posed
for financial stability––as Chuck Prince famously said, “[a]s long as the
music is playing, you’ve got to get up and dance”.87 But earlier in the
decade, when the MBS market was less frothy, dancing was less of a
necessity: it is not unreasonable to suggest that financial institutions should
have adopted a more circumspect and prudent approach to the creation,
promotion and purchase of MBSs at that stage, which would have
mitigated the growth of the bubble in the long-run.88 However, the
financial industry was so focused on short-term profits (especially the fee
income associated with the mortgage backed securitization process) that it
did not consider the long-term consequences of its activities for financial
stability.89
In the wake of the Financial Crisis, some members of the financial
industry have recognized their failures of indirect other-regarding
behavior.90 By and large, however, the gravity of the Financial Crisis has

86. Id.
87. Dealbook, Citi Chief on Buyouts: ‘We’re Still Dancing’, N.Y. TIMES, July 10,
2007, available at http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2007/07/10/citi-chief-on-buyout-loanswere-still-dancing/?_r=0.
88. Financial intermediaries assist in the creation of asset bubbles: they promote the
products because of the fee income associated with those products, and there is little check
on the quality or quantity of products issued because the financial intermediary has no skin
in the game. See Young, supra note 41, at 138 (discussing factors that lead to asset
bubbles). Pistor has emphasized that instability becomes built-in to the system at the time of
contracting, so that is the key point at which other-regarding behavior is most important.
Katharina Pistor, A Legal Theory of Finance, 41 J. COMP. ECON., 315, 327 (2013),.
89. See Kling, supra note 17, at 508 (discussing the misalignment of incentives in the
financial industry that led to the Financial Crisis).
90. In the aftermath of the Financial Crisis, Bank of America CEO Brian Moynihan
testified that “[o]ver the course of the crisis, we, as an industry, caused a lot of damage.
Never has it been clearer how poor business judgments we have made have affected Main
Street.” FCIC Report, supra note 71, at 389.
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not inspired the moral contrition that one might have expected. In fact,
many in the industry have come to see themselves as being persecuted for
failures of indirect other-regarding behavior that they view as simply being
part of their job.91 Furthermore, financial innovation and use of high levels
of leverage continue largely unabated. The financial industry’s failures of
other-regarding behavior cannot be blamed entirely on a pre-Crisis bubble
mentality. They reflect deep-seated cultural problems that have persisted
even through the Financial Crisis and the recession that followed.92
The industry’s lack of remorse has no doubt exacerbated the public
desire for some form of reprisal, but while some MBS-related fraud has
been prosecuted in the aftermath of the Financial Crisis,93 almost no
criminal charges have been levied against financial institutions—or their
senior managers—for actually causing the MBS bubble.94 Particularly
galling for many is the fact that no executive of Lehman Brothers has been
charged with any crime. This was not for want of trying: prosecutors
appear to have expended great effort in investigating potential leads.95 But
while Lehman Brothers’ management and employees certainly exhibited
failures of indirect other-regarding behavior (for example, by using high
91. As a hyperbolic example of this mentality, in an interview with the Wall Street
Journal, Robert Benmosche of AIG stated: “[t]he uproar over bonuses ‘was intended to stir
public anger, to get everybody out there with their pitch forks and their hangman nooses,
and all that–sort of like what we did in the Deep South [decades ago]. And I think it was
just as bad and just as wrong.’” Leslie Scism, AIG’s Benmosche and Miller on Villains,
Turnarounds and Those Bonuses, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 23, 2013, 2:32 PM),
http://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2013/09/23/aigs-benmosche-and-miller-on-villainsturnarounds-and-those-bonuses/tab/print/.
92. See infra Part II.C (discussing pathologies since the Financial Crisis).
93. The Department of Justice reported that in 2012, for example, 107 criminal
defendants were charged with fraud relating to homeowners distressed by the Financial
Crisis. Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force Members
Reveal
Results
of
Distressed
Homeowner
Initiative,
(Oct.
9,
2012),
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/October/12-ag-1216.html.
94. No Crime, No Punishment, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 2012 at SR10, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/26/opinion/sunday/no-crime-no-punishment.html.
The criminal prosecution of two former Bear Stearns hedge fund managers for securities
fraud was the highest profile criminal case arising out of the Crisis, but they were acquitted.
Zachery Kouwe and Dan Slater, 2 Bear Stearns Fund Leaders Are Acquitted, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 11, 2009 at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/11/business/
11bear.html. Even if the hedge fund managers had been found guilty, their crime would
have been deceiving their investors, rather than contributing to financial instability by
exacerbating a bubble in complex mortgage-backed financial products. Press Release, U.S.
Attorney’s Office for the E. Dist. of N.Y., Two Senior Managers Of Failed Bear Stearns
Hedge Funds Indicted On Conspiracy And Fraud Charges (June 19, 2008),
http://www.justice.gov/usao/nye/pr/2008/2008jun19.html.
95. Ben Protess & Susanne Craig, Inside the End of the U.S. Bid to Get Lehman, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 9, 2013, available at http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/09/08/inside-the-endof-the-u-s-bid-to-punish-lehman-executives/.
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levels of leverage to purchase illiquid complex assets like MBSs),96 there
was little evidence of behavior that was actually fraudulent. As Jed Rakoff
has noted, “If the Great Recession was in no part the handiwork of
intentionally fraudulent practices by high-level executives, then to
prosecute such executives criminally would be ‘scapegoating’ of the most
shallow and despicable kind.”97 The one potentially shady practice
identified by Anton Valukas, the Lehman Brothers’ Examiner, was
Lehman’s use of the “Repo 105” accounting manoeuver to “temporarily
remove $50 billion of assets from its balance sheet at first and second
quarter ends in 2008 so that it could report significantly lower net leverage
numbers than reality.”98 Ultimately, though, prosecutors concluded that
this accounting practice was technically legal.99 Regardless, the Repo 105
transactions were not destabilizing in and of themselves, but were used to
hide destabilizing actions (like highly-leveraged purchases of MBSs) that
had already been taken.100
Notwithstanding the dearth of criminal proceedings, an infinite array
of civil claims has been filed in connection with the MBS bubble.101 These
include claims alleging predatory conduct by mortgage lenders towards
mortgagors;102 securities fraud claims alleging that financial institutions
made misleading and deceptive statements to investors in connection with
the sale of MBSs;103 securities fraud claims brought by shareholders in
96. Examiner’s Report of Anton R. Valukas at 22, In re Lehman Bros. Holdings, 439
B.R. 811 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010) (Nos. 08-13555, 08-13888).
97. Jed S. Rakoff, The Financial Crisis: Why Have No High-Level Executives Been
Prosecuted?, N.Y. REVIEW OF BOOKS, Jan. 9, 2014, at 4.
98. Examiner’s Report, supra note 96, at 19.
99. Protess & Craig, supra note 95.
100. See Examiner’s Report, supra note 96, at 22.
101. This paragraph does not provide an exhaustive list of the types of claims that have
been brought. One of the more creative claims filed with regard to the MBS bubble alleged
that “subprime foreclosures constituted a public nuisance caused by defendant financial
institutions’ securitization practices”. See Christopher J. Miller, “Don’t Blame Me, Blame
the Financial Crisis”: A Survey of Dismissal Rulings in 10b-5 Suits for Subprime Securities
Losses, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 273, 275 (2011) for a discussion of City of Cleveland v.
Ameriquest Mortg. Sec., Inc., 615 F.3d 496 (6th Cir. 2010). For a more comprehensive
account of Crisis-related litigation, see David Zaring, Litigating the Financial Crisis, 100
VA. L. REV. 1405, 1469 (2014) (discussing the characteristics and kinds of crisis-related
litigation using Citigroup’s suit against Wells Fargo as an example).
102. For example, in October 2012, a class action was filed by the ACLU alleging that
Morgan Stanley had disproportionately targeted African Americans borrowers with highcost and high-risk residential mortgages. Jessica Silver-Greenberg, A.C.L.U. Filing Suit
Over
Loans,
N.Y.
TIMES,
Oct.
15,
2012,
at
B1,
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/15/business/aclu-to-sue-morgan-stanley-over-mortgageloans.html.
103. For a discussion of claims brought by the SEC in connection with misleading
statements made to MBS investors, see Peter J Henning, Mixed Results for S.E.C. in
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financial institutions alleging misleading and deceptive statements (for
example, that the institutions misrepresented the strength of their mortgage
underwriting standards or their exposure to subprime mortgages);104 and
claims alleging breach of fiduciary duties by financial institution boards for
failing to monitor their institution’s risk exposures.105 Some of these claims
have succeeded, but many have proven unsuccessful because of difficulties
in establishing scienter and causation,106 and because of courts’ reluctance
to hold financial institution boards liable for failing to monitor business
risk.107 Even if more of these claims had succeeded, however, they would
Financial Crisis Cases, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 19, 2012), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/
2012/11/19/mixed-results-for-s-e-c-in-financial-crisis-cases/. The SEC’s settlement with
Goldman Sachs over the CDO referred to as “ABACUS 2007-AC1” is illustrative: the SEC
filed a complaint against Goldman Sachs alleging that “marketing materials for ABACUS
2007-ACI ‘were false and misleading because they represented that ACA selected the
reference portfolio while omitting any mention that Paulson, a party with economic interests
adverse to CDO investors, played a significant role in the selection of the reference
portfolio.’” Jonathan Fisher, Claire Cregan, James di Giulio & Jodi Schutze, Economic
Crime and the Global Financial Crisis, 5 LAW & FIN. MKT. REV. 276, 278 (2011). Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac, the largest MBS investors in the U.S., have also “accused the banks
of duping the housing giants into buying $200 billion of mortgage securities that ultimately
imploded during the financial crisis”. Jessica Silver-Greenberg, Banks Seek to Overturn
Judge’s Ruling in a Mortgage Case, N.Y. TIMES , Mar. 28, 2013, at B10 available at
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/03/27/banks-seek-to-overturn-judges-ruling-in-criticalmortgage-case/.
104. For a rare example of a successful suit in this vein, see In re Countrywide Fin.
Corp. Sec. Litig., 588 F. Supp.2d 1132 (C.D. Cal. 2008). Courts have generally dismissed
such claims. See Hurt, infra note 290, at 267 (discussing how the Southern District of New
York has not seen a large number of successful suits against financial institutions).
105. These claims are usually framed as failure of the board’s duty to oversee or
monitor the financial institution. See, e.g., In re Citigroup Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig.,
964 A.2d 106 (Del. Ch. 2009) (“[A]lleging that directors breached their fiduciary duties by
failing to adequately protect corporation from exposure to subprime lending market, and
alleging that directors engaged in waste.”). However, other types of fiduciary duty claims
(including breach of the duty of care) have also been (unsuccessfully) alleged in the wake of
the Crisis. See, e.g., In re The Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc. S’holder Litig., 2011 WL 4826104
(Del. Ch. 2011) (“[A]lleging that [directors] breached their fiduciary duties by failing to
properly analyze and rationally set compensation levels for corporate employees, by
committing waste, . . . and by failing to adequately monitor the corporation’s operations.”).
For a discussion of these claims, see Hurt, infra note 290 at 275–79.
106. One survey of 10b-5 claims brought in the wake of the Financial Crisis found that
“Scienter has been the major hurdle for plaintiffs in financial crisis-related suits under
Section 10b and Rule 10b-5: in the cases examined, only one court that found the plaintiff’s
scienter allegations sufficient ultimately dismissed the complaint for failure to plead loss
causation.” Miller, supra note 101, at 304. For a discussion of the difficulties associated
with establishing liability for consumer claims relating to securitized mortgages, see
Kathleen C. Engel & Thomas J. Fitzpatrick IV, Complexity, Complicity, and Liability Up
the Securitization Food Chain: Investor and Arranger Exposure to Consumer Claims, 2
HARV. BUS. L. REV. 345 (2012).
107. See Symposium, A Board’s Duty to Monitor, 54 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 717, 739
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have enforced only the interests of mortgagors, MBS investors, or financial
institution shareholders. The brunt of the collapse of the financial system
was borne by people who had never even heard of MBSs, and who may not
have had mortgages or even bank accounts,108 let alone shares in financial
institutions.109
C. Pathologies Since the Financial Crisis
The preceding discussion focused on moral failings in the lead-up to
the Financial Crisis. Some have argued that the Financial Crisis was the
proverbial “100 Year Storm”, and thus unrepresentative of how the
financial industry usually works.110 Others thought that the Financial Crisis
was a product of a broken Wall Street culture, but hoped that the magnitude
of the Financial Crisis would prompt a change in that culture.
Unfortunately, it appears that potentially destabilizing behaviors, as well as
the financial industry’s failure to consider the interests of society, persist
and are endemic. The losses suffered by JPMorgan’s Chief Investment
Office (“CIO”) in 2012 (known colloquially as the “London Whale”
episode) are case in point.
By way of background, the CIO, which was created to invest the
bank’s excess deposits, started trading credit derivatives in 2006111 (the
stated purpose of the CIO’s credit derivatives portfolio was to “hedge” or

(2009) ( “[E]valuating the board’s success at monitoring business risk would . . . unleash the
dangers of hindsight bias.”).
108. In 2011, 8.2% of households had no bank accounts – many of these were lower
income and unemployed households. FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., 2011 NATIONAL SURVEY OF
UNBANKED AND UNDERBANKED HOUSEHOLDS 3-4 (2012).
109. For an anecdotal description of the impact of the Financial Crisis on lower income
and unemployed households, see Ronald A. Wilson, The View From South Tucson: How the
Economic Crisis Affects Defendants in My Courtroom, 48 JUDGES J. 14 (2009).
110. For example, in testimony before the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission,
Goldman Sachs CEO Lloyd Blankfein stated “After the shocks of recent months and the
associated economic pain, there is a natural and appropriate desire for wholesale reform. We
should resist a response, however, that is solely designed around protecting us from the 100year storm.” Lloyd C. Blankfein, Chairman and CEO, The Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc.,
Testimony Before the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission 12 (Jan. 13, 2010), http://fcicstatic.law.stanford.edu/cdn_media/fcic-testimony/2010-0113-Blankfein.pdf.
111. STAFF OF S. PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS. 113TH CONG., JPMORGAN
CHASE WHALE TRADES: A CASE HISTORY OF DERIVATIVES RISKS AND ABUSES 3 (2013)
[hereinafter, Senate Report]. The most commonly traded form of credit derivative is a credit
default swap, or CDS, which provides protection with respect to default risk on an
underlying debt instrument, such as a bond. Other, more complicated types of credit
derivatives, reference indices of debt instruments instead of a single debt instrument. Id. at
30-34.
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offset JPMorgan’s other credit risks in the long-term).112 In the first quarter
of 2012, the CIO was directed to reduce its risk-weighted assets – instead
of doing so by selling off the riskiest derivative assets in its portfolio, the
CIO opted to retain those assets and enter into additional risky derivatives
designed to offset its existing derivative assets (thus increasing the size and
risk of the total portfolio, and nullifying the hedging benefit of the
derivatives already in its portfolio).113 The portfolio started to lose value
rapidly, even as its size was being expanded: in March 2012 alone, $40
billion of credit derivatives were purchased for the portfolio, and the
portfolio reported $550 million of losses.114 The CIO had a number of risk
limits in place that were intended to alert the CIO if the derivatives and
other assets it held became too risky, and these risk limits were breached at
least 330 times in the first four months of 2012. However, these breaches
were either ignored, or the risk limits were themselves adjusted to allow the
portfolio to be operated as before.115 Trading was finally halted in late
March, but losses continued to grow – by the end of 2012, the portfolio was
reported as having lost $6.2 billion in total.116
Fortunately, the losses occasioned by the CIO’s trades were
insufficiently large to have any systemic effect. However, the Senate
report into the CIO’s losses appreciates the true systemic significance of
the episode: “The bank’s actions not only exposed the many risk
management deficiencies at JPMorgan Chase, but also raise systemic
concerns about how many other financial institutions may be disregarding
risk indicators and manipulating models to artificially lower risk results and
capital requirements.”117 While cognitive failures were certainly at work
here – JPMorgan would not have continued its trading strategy if the
traders and their managers didn’t think that the trades would eventually
become profitable – willfully misvaluing investments and ignoring risk
limits is symptomatic of an industry culture that, despite the lessons of the
Financial Crisis, continues to exalt short-term profit to the potential
detriment of long-term stability. As we have seen repeatedly, this lack of
regard for others cannot be attributed only to “bad apples” or “rogue
traders”.118 Instead, the traders within the CIO (including Bruno Iksil, the
so-called “London Whale”) consummated their trades openly and with the
blessing of some of the bank’s most senior managers, all of whom were

112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

Id. at 4, 12.
Id. at 3.
Id. at 4.
Id. at 7.
Id. at 4.
Id. at 8.
Id. at 14.
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therefore complicit in ignoring the breaches of risk metrics by the CIO’s
credit derivatives portfolio. For example, for four days in January 2012,
the portfolio breached the acceptable Value-at-Risk limit not only for the
portfolio, but for the whole bank, and the breach was reported all the way
up to Jamie Dimon, CEO of JPMorgan.119 Yet the CIO continued its
trading strategy unchastened until late March. As the Senate report puts it,
JPMorgan (which actually has the reputation of being one of the most
careful of the Wall Street firms)120 has a “culture in which risk limit
breaches were routinely disregarded, risk metrics were frequently criticized
or downplayed, and risk evaluation models were targeted by bank
personnel seeking to produce artificially lower capital requirements.”121
JPMorgan appears to have displayed some dishonesty here: the Senate
report recounts at length the ways in which the bank misinformed investors
and the public about its losses.122 In terms of financial stability, however,
the more culpable behavior is JPMorgan breaching internal risk protocols
rather than how subsequent losses were reported to investors and the
public. Once a highly-leveraged financial institution sustains sufficient
losses, it is likely to lose the confidence of, and thus short-term funding
from, other financial institutions: the experience of Bear Stearns and
Lehman Brothers shows that once confidence is lost, financial institution
failure can be precipitous, and contagious.123 Internal risk protocols are
designed to stop an institution from incurring such losses in the first place,
and thus protect both the institution and the system as a whole. Public
disclosures regarding losses occasioned by risky conduct will do nothing to
reduce those losses, and such disclosures may in fact precipitate
institutional failure by damaging confidence in the institution. Thus, as far
as financial stability is concerned, the moral failing here was not one of
dishonesty in public disclosures, but a failure to appreciate the potential
consequences for others of JPMorgan making investments that its own
internal systems had identified as too risky.
Although JPMorgan’s public disclosure failures were not problematic
from a financial stability perspective, hiding information about the CIO’s
risks and losses from JPMorgan’s regulators (primarily the OCC) could
have proved destabilizing. Regulators rely on real-time information from
large institutions to make judgment calls about the risks faced by such
119. Id. at 7.
120. See Henry T. C. Hu, Too Complex to Depict? Innovation, “Pure Information,” and
the SEC Disclosure Paradigm, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1601, 1671-1672 (2012) (“Dimon and JPM
were so respected that they were at the vanguard of the financial services industry to fend
off the impact of Dodd-Frank.”).
121. Senate Report, supra note 111, at 7.
122. Id. at 14.
123. Allen, Let’s Talk About Tax, supra note 59, at 864-65.
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institutions, and the financial system as a whole. Because JPMorgan was
not entirely forthcoming in its dealings with regulators,124 the OCC had
limited information on which to determine whether regulatory intervention
was required. It is appropriate, then, that the Attorney-General, the
Manhattan U.S. Attorney and the FBI Assistant Director-In-Charge,125 as
well as the SEC,126 have charged two JPMorgan derivatives traders with
fraudulent valuations, false filings and the keeping of false books and
records. In a similar vein, the SEC reached a settlement with JPMorgan,
which extracted civil penalties as well as a rare admission of wrongdoing
for “misstating financial results and lacking effective internal controls to
detect and prevent its traders from fraudulently overvaluing investments to
conceal hundreds of millions of dollars in trading losses.”127 Nonetheless,
these charges only address the outward trappings of JPMorgan’s outsized
risk-taking, rather than the risk-taking itself. That risk-taking, which
evinced a failure of indirect other-regarding behavior, remains
unpunishable by criminal sanctions—it could only have been addressed by
the OCC taking steps to enforce its prudential regulations against
JPMorgan.
Unfortunately, the OCC’s performance left much to be desired in this
instance: “[t]he increase in the [CIO derivatives portfolio’s] size and risk
triggered a breach of the CIO’s and bankwide [sic] VaR limits, which the
bank disclosed to the OCC in routine risk reports at the time, but which did
not trigger an agency inquiry.”128 It seems that it was easier for the OCC to
simply acquiesce in JPMorgan’s conduct,129 rather than taking more
aggressive actions that would have been unpopular with JPMorgan in the
short-term but upheld the regulators’ obligation to preserve financial
stability for others.130 The OCC’s conduct in this situation suggests that

124. Senate Report, supra note 111, at 8-9 (“[T]he bank was not forthcoming and even
provided incorrect information” about the CIO’s derivatives portfolio.). Id. at 14 (“In a
quarterly meeting in late January 2012, the bank told the OCC that it planned to reduce the
size of the SCP, but then increased the portfolio and its attendant risks.”).
125. Press Release, U.S. Attorney for the S. Dist. of N.Y., Attorney Gen., Manhattan
U.S. Attorney, and FBI Assistant Director-In-Charge Announce Charges Against Two
Derivatives Traders In Connection With Multi-Billion Dollar Trading Loss At JPMorgan
Chase & Company (Aug. 14, 2013).
126. Press Release No. 2013-154, Sec. Exch. Comm’n., SEC Charges Two J.P. Morgan
Traders with Fraudulently Overvaluing Investments to Conceal Losses (Aug. 14, 2013).
127. Press Release No. 2013-187, Sec. Exch. Comm’n., JPMorgan Chase Agrees to Pay
$200 Million and Admits Wrongdoing to Settle SEC Charges (Sept. 19, 2013).
128. Senate Report, supra note 111, at 9.
129. When the OCC tried to investigate JPMorgan’s conduct in the past, they were
criticized by JPMorgan as “being overly intrusive”. Id. at 14.
130. Id. at 10 (“JPMorgan Chase’s ability to dodge effective OCC oversight . . .
demonstrates that bank regulators need to conduct more aggressive oversight with their
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regulatory failings, in addition to industry failings, persist post-Financial
Crisis.
II.

ADDRESSING FINANCIAL INDUSTRY CULTURE

The previous section illustrated that financial instability is a product of
both cognitive failures and failures of indirect other-regarding behavior. A
large post-Crisis scholarship has already examined the relevant cognitive
failures in depth: this Section focuses instead on ways of changing the
norms that characterize financial industry culture,131 in order to promote
more other-regarding behavior.
To date, much of the legal scholarship on norms has followed the law
and economics paradigm. For example, McAdams’ much-cited esteem
theory of norms relies on a rationally self-interested calculus by an actor
about how he or she is perceived. Self-interest is viewed as encompassing
reputational utility as well as material interests, and McAdams posits that
“the initial force behind norm creation is the desire individuals have for
respect or prestige, that is, for the relative esteem of others.”132 The law
and economics literature thus focuses on using “reputation, expressive
effects, shaming and social sanctioning”133 to create norms and change
behavior.134
Unfortunately, the prescriptions of law and economics hold little
promise for affecting a broad shift in the financial industry’s norms with
respect to destabilizing activities. For example, while unrestrained
leverage and financial innovation can prove to be destabilizing, judicious
existing tools and develop more effective tools to detect and stop unsafe and unsound
derivatives trading.”).
131. William C. Dudley, President, Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., Enhancing Financial
Stability by Improving Culture in the Financial Services Industry: Remarks at the Workshop
on Reforming Culture and Behavior in the Financial Services Industry, (Oct. 20, 2014)
(“Culture [within a financial institution] relates to the implicit norms that guide behavior in
the absence of regulations or compliance rules—and sometimes despite those explicit
restraints. Culture exists within every firm whether it is recognized or ignored, whether it is
nurtured or neglected, and whether it is embraced of disavowed. Culture reflects the
prevailing attitudes and behaviors within a firm. It is how people react not only to black and
white, but to all of the shades of grey. Like a gentle breeze, culture may be hard to see, but
you can feel it. Culture relates to what ‘should’ I do, and not to what ‘can’ I do.”).
132. Richard H. McAdams, Origin, Development and Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH. L.
REV. 338, 342 (1997) (emphasis added).
133. Yuval Feldman, Behavioral Ethics Meets Behavioral Law and Economics, in THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS AND LAW 213, 225 (2014).
134. McAdams, supra note 132, at 355 (“If many people agree that a behavior deserves
disapproval, if there is an inherent risk the behavior will be detected, and if this agreement
and risk are well-known, then the pattern of disapproval itself creates cost to the behavior.
When sufficiently large, these cost produce a norm against the behavior.”).
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amounts of these activities are necessary to the proper functioning of the
financial system.135 Consequently, it is very difficult to delineate ex ante the
levels of such activities that we want to permit, and those we do not.
Without clear rules about what is and is not acceptable, problematic
behavior “cannot be articulated, publicized, and detected with the clarity
and consistency that is necessary to marshal the public to shun
offenders”.136 Dombalagian makes a similar point in the context of the
Volcker Rule (a provision of Dodd-Frank which limits—but recognizes
some beneficial aspects of—proprietary trading by banking entities): “both
the Rule itself and the rules promulgated thereunder attest to the difficulty
of defining the kind of conduct promoted, tolerated or discouraged under
the putative norm.”137 In the absence of clarity, public shaming cannot be
harnessed to create industry-wide norms regarding destabilizing activities.
Within a financial institution that was truly committed to indirect
other-regarding behavior, there would be more scope for the forging of
norms through reputational utility. An institution can be more prescriptive
about the types of activities that are and are not permitted within that
institution, and an employee who deviates from these rules for the purpose
of making short-term gains might run the risk of opprobrium and blame
from his peers within the firm138 (as well as the risk of being disciplined or
fired). Financial activities, however, are constantly evolving, and internal
firm activities restrictions might not always be able to be as prescriptive as
we might like. More importantly, large financial institutions currently tend
to herd together in performing destabilizing but immediately profitable
activities,139 and an individual financial institution that forgoes profit in
order to improve stability without the protection of the herd risks
punishment from its shareholders.140 What is most needed, then, is an
industry-wide norm of indirect other-regarding behavior, rather than
activity- and institution-specific norms.141 The aim of this Section is to
135. See supra text accompanying notes 42-43.
136. Dombalagian, supra note 12, at 499.
137. Id. at 500.
138. Sunstein, supra note 27, at 945 (“[Experimental work] shows that agents are
willing to cooperate, and hence to solve collective action problems without coercion, if most
people are seen as cooperators; in such circumstances the social meaning of noncooperation
is greed or selfishness.”).
139. Brett McDonnell, Don’t Panic! Defending Cowardly Interventions During and
After a Crisis, 116 PENN. ST. L. REV. 1, 13 (2011) (“Should the strategy fail, everyone will
be in the same boat and individual managers will get little blame.”).
140. William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, The Case Against Shareholder
Empowerment, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 653, 720-721 (2010).
141. Claire Hill & Richard Painter, Berle’s Vision Beyond Shareholder Interests: Why
Investment Bankers Should Have (Some) Personal Liability, 33 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1173,
1197 (2010) (arguing that the financial industry needs to make “excessive risk takers . . .
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explore ways of reorienting the governing norms of the financial industry
as a whole in ways that do not rely on censure and shaming from the
general public.
New bodies of research have emerged that critique the law and
economics scholarship and recognize that rational self-interest is not the
only motivator of behavior.142 This research demonstrates that internal
motivators, as well as social context, are important drivers of behavior, and
that shaming is not the only way to motivate cultural change. As such,
educational and institutional reforms can improve financial stability if they
succeed in causing financial industry participants to internalize norms of
indirect other-regarding behavior,143 so that such norms “come to mind in
decision-making because they are part of [a financial industry employee’s]
identity, [and] they thus contend with, and even suppress, other
motivations, such as the self-interest that may characterize his or her
business identity and that of the business group.”144
One such body of literature that contradicts the law and economics
approach is known as behavioral ethics.145 Developed primarily by
management scholars, behavioral ethics is concerned with two different
levels of cognitive processing:146 System 1 relates to intuitive processes,
whereas System 2 is characterized by conscious thought and reasoning.147
Behavioral ethicists conclude that while we may often automatically and
unconsciously act in our own self-interest (as a result of the intuitive
processes of System 1),148 we are also motivated by an innate desire to view
ourselves as moral creatures.149 As such, if norms of indirect otherregarding behavior are internalized and kept salient, deliberative System 2
cognition can override the self-interest sought by System 1.150 (It is even
stand out from the herd instead of leading everyone else over the precipice.”).
142. Feldman, supra note 133, at 15-16 (“[S]ocial norms change behavior mostly by
subconscious effects that are not associated with the costs and benefits of following social
norms.”).
143. Fanto, supra note 34, at 45.
144. Id. at 42-43.
145. Feldman, supra note 133, at 15-16 (arguing that behavioral ethics takes the view
that self-interest is a subconscious motivator, whereas law and economics expects a more
rational and conscious calculation of costs and benefits in determining what constitutes selfinterest).
146. Id.
147. On Amir & Orly Lobel, Stumble, Predict, Nudge: How Behavioral Economics
Informs Law and Policy, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 2098, 2110 (2008).
148. Feldman, supra note 133, at 4.
149. Nina Mazar, On Amir & Dan Arierly, The Dishonesty of Honest People: A Theory
of Self-Concept Maintenance, 45 J. MKTG. RES. 633, 634 (2008) (“[I]t has been shown that
people typically . . . have strong beliefs in their own morality, and that they want to maintain
this aspect of their self-concept.”).
150. Fanto, supra note 34, at 34.
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possible that norms of other-regarding behavior may become part of
System 1’s instinctual response. Some research indicates that in social
contexts, being seen as cooperative and esteemed by one’s peers is in one’s
self interest, and so cooperating with accepted norms becomes
automatic).151 While the behavioral ethics literature expresses a concern
that System 2 might sometimes be deployed after the fact to rationalize and
justify automatic self-interested behavior, rather than preventing it in the
first place,152 even this would be an improvement over the financial
industry’s status quo. At present, there is no need for industry personnel to
even rationalize their self-interested actions, and thus their activities are not
impeded by any cognitive dissonance whatsoever.
An alternative challenge to traditional law and economics is posed by
the prosocial literature, which finds that that while self-interest is certainly
a relevant motivator, innate other-regarding norms also inform our
behavior so long as incentives and cultural factors are not stacked too
heavily against such norms.153 Summarizing the empirical findings
regarding when prosocial behavior is more (and less) likely, Stout has
developed the following model for creating the optimal conditions for
people to act in the interests of others, simply because it is the right thing to
do:
Unselfish prosocial behavior toward strangers, including
unselfish compliance with legal and ethical rules, is triggered by
social context, including especially:
instructions from authority;
beliefs about others’
prosocial behavior; and
the magnitude of benefits to
others.
Prosocial behavior declines, however, as the personal cost
of acting prosocially increases.154
This section’s discussion of educational and industry reforms will be
primarily informed by Stout’s model.
To be clear, even once internalized, other-regarding norms provide no
precise prescription for how financial industry personnel should act.155

151. Feldman, supra note 133, at 8.
152. The concern is that people “do harm when it serves their self-interest and at the
same time feel good about it”. Id. at 19.
153. See supra notes 13-16 and accompanying text.
154. STOUT, supra note 11, at 99 (emphasis in original).
155. This is inevitable, given that something as complex as financial stability does not
lend itself to “ascertainably correct solutions.” Bandes, supra note 21 at 220.
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Different people might have different conceptions of what is in others’ best
interests, and some might think that financial stability should be
subservient to other public interests.156 For example, arguments have been
made that the MBS bubble was actually caused by other-regarding
behavior, in the sense that it was inspired by the Community Reinvestment
Act and other policies aimed at making home ownership more accessible—
at the expense of financial stability.157 In fact, the evidence is reasonably
clear that these arguments are incorrect and that affordable housing policies
were not responsible for causing the Financial Crisis.158 Nonetheless, if the
promotion of home ownership had been the true animus of the financial
industry in the lead-up to the Financial Crisis, this Article would not be in a
position to say that the industry had demonstrated any failure of indirect
other-regarding behavior in connection with the MBS bubble: this Article
does not purport to say how people should evaluate others’ best interests,
only that they should evaluate others’ best interests.
This does not mean, however, that exhortations towards indirect otherregarding behavior are completely indeterminate or lacking in content.
One clear guideline is that it is unacceptable for financial industry
personnel to focus entirely on their short-term self-interest, or on the shortterm self-interest of the institution that employs them. Another clear
guideline is that financial industry personnel should start from the
presumption that there is societal benefit to complying with regulation and
cooperating with regulators, instead of automatically adopting a zero-sum
stance and assuming that all regulation should be arbitraged.159 The final
156. Saule T. Omarova, Bankers, Bureaucrats and Guardians: Towards Tripartism in
Financial Services Regulation, 37 J. CORP. L. 621, 669 (2012); Bandes, supra note 21, at
227.
157. Peter J. Wallison, Dissenting Statement, FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N (2011),
http://fcic-static.law.stanford.edu/cdn_media/fcic-reports/fcic_final_report_wallison_
dissent.pdf; Phil Gramm & Mike Solon, The Clinton-Era Roots of the Financial Crisis,
WALL ST. J., Aug. 12, 2013, http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142412788732347760457
9000571334113350.
158. For a methodical debunking of Wallison’s arguments, see DAVID MIN, CTR. FOR
AM. PROGRESS, WHY WALLISON IS WRONG ABOUT THE GENESIS OF THE U.S. HOUSING
CRISIS: RESPONDING TO WALLISON’S LATEST DEFENSE OF HIS FLAWED FINANCIAL CRISIS
INQUIRY COMMISSION DISSENT, (2011), http://www.americanprogress.org/wp-content/
uploads/issues/2011/07/pdf/ min_wallison.pdf.
159. William C. Dudley, President and C.E.O., Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., Ending Too
Big To Fail, Remarks at the Global Economic Policy Forum (Nov. 7, 2013) (noting that
regulatory reform alone “may not solve another important problem evident within some
large financial institutions—the apparent lack of respect for law, regulation and the public
trust.”); Fanto, supra note 34, at 5 (noting that “a compliance approach that changes the
perspective of firm employees so that they consider policies behind the rules, which include
the long-term stability of the financial system and customer confidence in the markets,
would help employees understand the potential dangers of certain financial products and
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clear guideline is that, given the gravity of the social consequences of
financial instability, the promotion of financial stability should always at
least figure in the other-regarding behavior calculus for financial industry
personnel (even if it is ultimately decided that there is some more deserving
goal that trumps financial stability).
Within this framework, financial industry personnel may come to
different conclusions about how best to minimize the destabilizing
externalities of their activities,160 and about whether and when financial
stability should be subservient to other goals. Differing opinions on these
issues are not necessarily a bad thing: Professors Romano and Whitehead
have written at length about how regulation that correlates behavior can
prove destabilizing,161 and encouraging industry personnel to make their
own other-regarding judgments might mitigate this destabilizing
correlation. In some circumstances, though, financial industry personnel
may turn out to be just plain wrong in their assessments and their cognitive
errors, despite the best other-regarding intentions, may end up destabilizing
the financial system.162 This possibility of error does not mean, however,
that attempts to engender more indirect other-regarding behavior in the
financial industry are pointless. Holding the potential for cognitive errors
equal, it stands to reason that destabilizing behavior will be less likely in
circumstances where externalities are considered than in circumstances
where they are not. And this is likely understating the case for indirect
other-regarding behavior: too intense a focus on short-term self-interest is
likely to limit a cognitive assessment of the risks involved in a given
activity,163 and so the potential for cognitive errors is likely higher in the
absence of other-regarding behavior.
It is, of course, a monumental task to change an industry’s culture to
render it more other-regarding, and the reforms suggested in this Article are
only first steps in trying to achieve this goal. The silver lining, however, is
that for many people, the norms of short-term self-interest that guide the
financial industry are adopted later in life, in graduate education or on the

services” (emphasis added)).
160. Allen, New Philosophy, supra note 42, at 203 (“the complexity of the financial
system . . . is such that precise answers cannot be achieved”).
161. Roberta Romano, For Diversity in the International Regulation of Financial
Institutions: Critiquing and Recalibrating the Basel Architecture, 31 YALE J. ON REG. 1
(2014); Charles K. Whitehead, Destructive Coordination, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 323 (2011).
162. It is impossible to perfectly calibrate activities in a way that both allows for growth,
and ensures that no risks are taken that would imperil the stability of the financial system.
Brett H. McDonnell, Of Mises and Min(sky): Libertarian and Liberal Responses to
Financial Crises Past and Present, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1279, 1310 (2011).
163. See supra note 22 and accompanying text (discussing incentive bias and
underappreciated risk).
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job, and are generally compartmentalized to that education or job.164 While
some individuals are by nature more self-interested than others,165 if
financial industry culture as a whole is made more other-regarding, then
that could lessen the attraction for those individuals to join the financial
industry.166 To the extent that norms of short-term self-interest are learned,
they can be unlearned,167 notwithstanding how deeply ingrained they are
currently in financial institution culture. There is no single policy solution
that can revolutionize financial industry culture in this way: such an
endeavor requires a multi-pronged approach that confronts different aspects
of business education and financial institution operations. The remainder
of this Section will therefore explore a variety of proposals for
complementary reforms.
A. Business School Reform
Since the 1960s, when neoclassical economics became the touchstone
of business education,168 morality and values have been largely excluded
from the core business school curriculum.169 Although many business
schools offer ethics and behavioral economics courses that challenge the
position that we are all rational self-interested actors, traditional
neoclassical economic modeling continues to hold sway in core business
classes. These core classes thus tend to dismiss consideration of values,
which are “hard to define, hard to measure, and seemingly at odds with the
calculating rationality that was the starting point for traditional economic
modeling.”170 Given this context, it is perhaps not surprising that research
164. Richard Painter, The Moral Responsibilities of Investment Bankers, 8 U. ST.
THOMAS L.J. 5, 18-19 (2010).
165. This Article does not tackle the issue of whether the financial industry tends to
attract employees who are somehow less moral than the average person. It focuses instead
on how financial industry culture causes individuals to put aside the other-regarding
inclinations that they do have.
166. Dudley, supra note 131 (“[T]he degree to which an industry attracts risk-takers is
not pre-ordained, but reflects the prevailing incentives in the industry. After all, risk-takers
have options.”).
167. Moral norms that guide behavior can be learned and unlearned. George A. Akerlof
& Rachel E. Kranton, Identity and the Economics of Organizations, 19 J. ECON.
PERSPECTIVES 9, 12 (2005).
168. JUSTIN FOX, THE MYTH OF THE RATIONAL MARKET: A HISTORY OF RISK, REWARD,
AND DELUSION ON WALL STREET 103 (2011).
169. Herbert Gintis & Rakesh Khurana, Corporate Honesty and Business Education: A
Behavioral Model, in MORAL MARKETS: THE CRITICAL ROLE OF VALUES IN THE ECONOMY
300 (Paul J. Zak ed., 2008).
170. Oliver R. Goodenough, Values, Mechanism Design and Fairness, in MORAL
MARKETS: THE CRITICAL ROLE OF VALUES IN THE ECONOMY 228, 228 (Paul J. Zak ed.,
2008); see also Long Wang, Deepak Malhotra & J. Keith Murnighan, Economics Education
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indicates that those with economic and financial training tend to be more
selfish and less other-regarding than other members of society.171 If,
however, business education is responsible for repressing natural
inclinations towards other-regarding behavior, then we have a very good
idea about where to start fixing financial industry culture (and even when
incoming students already show a strong propensity towards self-interest,
business school education can help mitigate this).172
To these ends, a number of scholars have called for an overhaul of
business education that stresses the importance of trust, honesty, decency,
accountability, fairness and the common good, rather than having business
schools teach that compensation is the only important motivator.173 This is
intended to return business education to its pre-1960s roots as informed by
“a rhetoric of social duty that framed business education as having a higher
aim than mere ‘moneymaking.’”174 As part of such an overhaul, ethics
should be integrated into core business school classes so that students are
given some guidance as to how to make other-regarding choices in context,
rather than ethics being relegated to stand-alone courses that are often
dismissed as a waste of time.175 Some sense of history of financial booms
and busts (and the contribution that the financial industry has made thereto)
should also be incorporated into core business school courses: people are
more likely to engage in other-regarding behaviors if the magnitude of
perceived benefits to others is large,176 so it is important that business
school students learn about how the financial industry can exacerbate the
ups and downs of the business cycle (particularly through its use of
and Greed, 10 ACAD. MGMT. LEARNING EDUC. 643, 643-47 (2011) (commenting on how
economics training assumes self-interest maximization and de-emphasizes social
consequences).
171. For a discussion of this research, see Stout, MORAL MARKETS, supra note 26, at
168-70; see also Jackson, supra note 77, at 750-52. Of course, this finding may be partially
explained by self-selection: more selfish individuals may be drawn to business school. To
that end, Thomas J. Peters’ proposal that elite business schools “apply a simple admissions
rule: anyone from an ultra-privileged background needs to have done something of
significant social value to be admitted,” may assist. Jodi Kantor, Class Is Seen Dividing
Harvard Business School, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/10/
education/harvard-business-students-see-class-as-divisive-an-issue-as-gender.html.
172. Robert A. Giacalone & Mark D. Promislo, Broken When Entering: The
Stigmatization of Goodness and Business Ethics Education, 12 ACAD. MGMT. LEARNING
EDUC. 86, 95-96 (2013).
173. Gintis & Khurana, supra note 169, at 300-01; Jackson, supra note 77, at 758;
Zingales, infra note 264.
174. RAKESH KHURANA, FROM HIGHER AIMS TO HIRED HANDS: THE SOCIAL
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN BUSINESS SCHOOLS AND THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF
MANAGEMENT AS A PROFESSION 91 (2007).
175. Zingales, infra note 264.
176. STOUT, supra note 11, at 99.
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leverage), and the human cost of financial instability.177 In the absence of
such instruction, students may assume that the business cycle is entirely
independent of their actions,178 and thus that prosocial behavior is
irrelevant. Furthermore, if financial stability is framed as the desired status
quo rather than as a transitional phase of the business cycle, deviations
from financial stability are more likely to be viewed as a loss to be
avoided.179
Given that prosocial behavior is often triggered by instructions from
authority,180 it is key that the ethics and history components of the business
school curriculum are taught by business school deans and prominent
faculty members.181 Other-regarding behaviors could also be encouraged
by offering some type of clinic in business schools, where students provide
less-privileged members of society with services like financial counseling
or retirement planning. Once students graduate and start working in the
financial industry, it has been observed that “[a] strong in-group versus outgroup cultural orientation [often exists which encourages] the maintenance
of a highly aggressive, opportunistic stance toward outsiders”:182 distance
between those in the financial industry and those ultimately impacted by
the industry’s decisions makes it difficult to establish an other-regarding,
stability-minded culture.183 By creating relationships during business
177. McDonnell, supra note 139, at 27 (“As memories of bad times dim, banks and
businesses become willing to take on more risk.”); see also FOX, supra note 168, at 319.
Historical material would have the added benefit of familiarizing students with the mistakes
that caused those past crises, hopefully making it less likely that those mistakes will be
repeated.
178. HO, supra note 25, at 11 (“[T]he construction of booms and busts are simply
conflated with ‘the market’ and are not understood as arising from the particular workplace
models, corporate culture, and organizational values of Wall Street financial institutions
(investment banks in particular) or the specific and personal experiences of those who work
for them.”).
179. Compelling research has found that people prefer avoiding losses to making gains.
As such, framing a problem as a loss can have a significant impact on how people respond
to that problem. Cass R. Sunstein, Moral Heuristics, 28 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 531, 535
(2005).
180. STOUT, supra note 11, at 99.
181. Gintis & Khurana, supra note 169, at 324 (“[B]usiness school faculties and deans
have an institutional responsibility to socialize students to a model of behavior that inspires
them to respect other institutions in society, especially the basic units of family and
community, and to inspire students to accept the responsibilities and obligations that come
with occupying society’s most powerful positions.”).
182. Langevoort, supra note 17, at 1216.
183. STOUT, supra note 11 at 101. The increasing specialization of, and lengths of
chains of intermediation within, the financial industry have led to ever-greater attenuation
between the decisions made by individual industry employees and those impacted by their
decisions. Awrey et al., supra note 10, at 14 (“[T]he anonymity within large, complex
organizations; technologies enabling ‘faceless’ communication across great distances, and
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school between students and those outside of the financial sector, a
business school clinic program (which could be complemented by an
ongoing pro bono requirement for the financial industry) could be effective
in ensuring that financial industry personnel see people who are impacted
by their decisions, but do not themselves have control over the levers of
financial stability. Consequently, students would view these individuals as
sufficiently connected to them to be worthy of their consideration.184 Not
only would these programs put a face on the “other” the financial industry
should be regarding, they also have the potential to change the financial
industry’s perspective on money. Realizing that a few hundred dollars can
mean a world of difference to some people might shatter the blasé
indifference that can come from constantly seeing strings of zeroes flash
across a computer screen with little perceptible consequence.185
B. Corporate Governance Reform
It is clear that it will take time for any changes made in business
education to percolate into the financial industry.186 Because of the
importance of instructions from authority in establishing what is and is not
acceptable behavior,187 there is a very real concern that more seasoned
industry veterans, weaned on a philosophy of pure self-interest, will “haze”
any other-regarding behavior inculcated in business schools out of new
financial industry employees. To that end, reforming business education
will not work on its own; it must be coupled with efforts to change industry
culture from within.
To date, most attempts to reform risk-taking in financial institutions
have focused on compensation incentive structures. There are many papers
that have already explored how banker pay incentivizes short-termism and
a “heads we win, tails you lose” attitude amongst bank employees.188 This
the commoditization of business transactions and relationships might all be expected to
decrease moral intensity.”).
184. Research suggests that violations of the norm of other-regarding can to some extent
be excused when the “other” is perceived to be outside of the actor’s in-group. Stout,
MORAL MARKETS, supra note 26, at 162; Zak, supra note 21, at 262.
185. This would encourage a better appreciation of the magnitude of the benefit of
financial stability, as per part (iii) of Stout’s model. STOUT, supra note 11, at 99.
186. See Gintis & Khurana, supra note 169, at 302 (describing the anti-corruption
socialization campaigns in Hong Kong schools as an example of the delayed impact of
education campaigns on social norms).
187. STOUT, supra note 11, at 99.
188. The most prominent of these papers being Bebchuk & Spamann, infra note 325.
For a focus on the compensation of traders, rather than executives, see Simone M. Sepe &
Charles K. Whitehead, Paying for Risk: Bankers, Compensation, and Competition (Cornell
Law Faculty Working Papers, Paper No. 114, 2014).
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Article will not retread that ground. Instead, this Article draws attention to
how difficult it is to fine-tune the alignment of incentives with desired risk
taking; the multiplicity of differing proposals for compensation reform
attests to this idea.189 This Article also notes that these complex proposals
invite arbitrage, which could have unintended and unforeseen destabilizing
consequences. Thus, while this Article recognizes the value of attempts to
better align compensation incentives with society’s interest in financial
stability, it stresses the importance of exploring broader cultural reform
proposals as well.190
Importantly, desired outcomes can sometimes be achieved without the
micro-manipulation of incentives; people often obey internalized moral
norms without material incentives to do so because they want to maintain a
positive conception of themselves as moral human beings.191 Short notes
that “[n]ormatively motivated decisions are often characterized precisely
by their disregard of the material costs and benefits of the action.”192 As
such, if people within the financial industry were to see themselves as
having a social responsibility to avoid financial instability, they would be
more willing to forgo short-term financial gain in order to maintain their

189. See, e.g., Bebchuk & Spamann infra note 325, at 253; FINANCIAL STABILITY
FORUM, FSF PRINCIPLES FOR SOUND COMPENSATION PRACTICES 2 (2009); Sanjai Bhagat &
Roberta Romano, Reforming Executive Compensation: Focusing and Committing to the
Long Term, 26 YALE J. ON REG. 359 (2009); U.K. PARLIAMENTARY COMMITTEE ON BANKING
STANDARDS, infra note 280, at 8-9; Sepe & Whitehead, supra note 188. Bruner notes that
“the combined thinking [on how to structure compensation to balance risk and financial
rewards] of seven financial regulators, comprising fifty pages of the Federal Register,
amounts to little more than a directive to reduce risk-taking. How, exactly, is that to be
done? ‘We don’t know,’ our regulators implicitly reply. ‘You figure it out.’” Christopher M.
Bruner, Concepts of Corporate Purpose in Post-Crisis Financial Firms, 36 SEATTLE U. L.
REV. 527, 558 (2013).
190. It is also worth considering whether hard caps on financial industry compensation
should be implemented, given that “the increasing presence of money and wealth in the
immediate surroundings tends to prompt more selfishness.” Langevoort, supra note 17, at
1240. In a related vein, Sepe & Whitehead make several proposals aimed at taming market
pressures to reward traders with extremely high salaries. Sepe & Whitehead, supra note
188. Although the EU’s decision to cap bank bonuses has been criticized by the Squam
Lake Group for failing to properly address bankers’ risk-taking incentives, the cap may
nonetheless be valuable if it allows room for norms of other-regarding behavior to flourish.
Martin N. Baily et al., Aligning Incentives at Systemically Important Financial Institutions
(Columbia Bus. Sch Working Paper No. 13-18, 2013), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2239895 (critizing EU’s decision to cap bank bonuses). A
reduction in compensation could also discourage naturally self-interested people from
gravitating to the financial industry in the first place.
191. “[T]o maintain their positive self-concepts, people will comply with their internal
standards even when doing so involves investments of effort or sacrificing financial gains.”
Mazar et al., supra note 149, at 633.
192. Short, supra note 23, at 505.
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self-concept as a steward for the financial system (and regulations and
regulators would have less work to do).193 Incidentally, such a shift toward
other-regarding behavior and sense of societal purpose might also increase
job satisfaction in the industry.194 This section will therefore explore
reforms that can assist in creating an environment in which such otherregarding behavior can flourish.
1. Board Reforms
At present, the boards of financial institutions are primarily concerned
with the interests of their shareholders.195 Financial stability, however,
would be best served by authorizing such boards to consider the interests of
non-shareholder stakeholders.196 While prioritizing the interests of such
stakeholders would certainly be a departure from the prevailing theories of
corporate governance,197 special governance rules for financial institutions

193. ZAK, supra note 21, at 264; STOUT, supra note 11, at 212; Fanto, supra note 34, at
28.
194. Disaffectedness and cognitive dissonance can arise when natural inclinations
towards other-regarding behavior are shut out of the workplace: “Researchers have . . .
found a connection between self-reported happiness and ethical behavior.” STOUT, supra
note 11, at 241. Unfortunately, the current ethos of the financial industry might be
summarized as “a “lose-lose” proposition, either wealth and irresponsibility or integrity and
failure.” Solomon, supra note 24, at 36. An op-ed written by former Goldman Sachs
employee Greg Smith has come to epitomize the disaffectedness that many financial
industry employees feel:
culture was always a vital part of Goldman Sachs’s success. It revolved around
teamwork, integrity, a spirit of humility, and always doing right by our clients.
The culture was the secret sauce that made this place great and allowed us to
earn our clients’ trust for 143 years. It wasn’t just about making money; this
alone will not sustain a firm for so long. It had something to do with pride and
belief in the organization. I am sad to say that I look around today and see
virtually no trace of the culture that made me love working for this firm for
many years. I no longer have the pride, or the belief. . . . I truly believe that this
decline in the firm’s moral fiber represents the single most serious threat to its
long-run survival. . . . I don’t know of any illegal behavior, but will people push
the envelope and pitch lucrative and complicated products to clients even if they
are not the simplest investments or the ones most directly aligned with the
client’s goals? Absolutely. Every day, in fact.
Greg Smith, Why I Am Leaving Goldman Sachs, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 2012, at A27.
195. ANAT ADMATI & MARTIN HELLWIG, THE BANKERS’ NEW CLOTHES: WHAT’S
WRONG WITH BANKING AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 126 (2013).
196. Financial institution shareholders often push those institutions to generate profits
from high-risk activities that can prove destabilizing. Bruner, supra note 189, at 552-53,
557-559.
197. The prevailing theory of corporate governance is that “public corporations ‘belong’
to their shareholders, and they exist for one purpose only, to maximize shareholders’ wealth.
Shareholder wealth, in turn, is typically measured by share price—meaning share price
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are not entirely unprecedented: a number of courts have opined that bank
directors owe duties to a broader range of constituents than do directors of
non-bank corporations.198 In any event, a systemic failure will impact
diversified shareholders more than the profitability of any one institution,199
so financial stability is actually in the best interests of most financial
institution shareholders.
As such, financial institution boards can
justifiably prioritize financial stability, even though doing so could
detrimentally impact the institution’s share price.
There are therefore strong justifications for allowing the boards and
managers of financial institutions to consider issues of financial stability in
their deliberations. Awrey, Blair and Kershaw have proposed a “Take
Externalities Seriously” initiative, which would require financial
institutions to implement controls and processes:
(1) to ensure that the identification and avoidance of socially
excessive risk taking is embedded in corporate culture; (2) to
identify and monitor potential socially excessive (i.e. systemic)
risks generated by a firm’s activities; (3) to better understand a
firm’s exposure to systemic risk; and (4) to determine how best to
minimize these risks on an ongoing basis.200
In particular, Awrey et al. propose that financial institutions should be
required to have a senior ethics committee on the board of directors that
would oversee monitoring and reporting of socially-excessive risk-

today.” LYNN A. STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH: HOW PUTTING SHAREHOLDERS
FIRST HARMS INVESTORS, CORPORATIONS AND THE PUBLIC 2-3 (2012). However, the
assumption that corporations are legally required to maximize shareholder value is in many
respects an ideological position that is susceptible to challenge. Id. at 3-4.
198. Robert T. Miller, Oversight Liability for Risk-Management Failures at Financial
Firms, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 47 (2010-11).
199. John Armour & Jeffrey N. Gordon, Systemic Harms and Shareholder Value, 6 J.
LEGAL ANALYSIS 35, 40-41 (2013).
200. Awrey et al., supra note 10, at 33. To be clear, while corporate governance
initiatives are intended to encourage better behavior from within the industry, they will not
take root or succeed without some external regulation backing them up. Regulators would
therefore need to require financial institutions to implement the necessary board committees
and compliance mechanisms, and should judge fulfillment of such requirements by the level
of the financial institution’s commitment to raising awareness of, and establishing norms
that seek to avoid, the negative externalities of financial institution activities. Awrey et al.,
supra note 10, at 33. In addition, the SEC’s Regulation S-K could be amended to require
financial institutions that are listed in the United States to publicly disclose the steps they
are taking to improve financial stability by reducing externalities. This would require
financial institutions to develop clear compliance plans, and the public dissemination of
such plans could build up to the creation of best practices for institutions to follow.
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taking.201 Such an initiative could, for example, empower boards to
prioritize lower leverage and longer-term funding options for the
institution’s trading operations, notwithstanding that these may generate
less profit for shareholders in the short-term. Similarly, it could support
policies to abandon the development of complex new products that
demonstrate limited social utility, even though the products might generate
large fees for the institution in the short-term (or at least implement policies
that require that a single individual retain day-to-day responsibility for the
entire life-cycle of the new financial product).202
If, as per Awrey et al.’s proposal, consideration of externalities is
going to fall heavily on financial institution boards, it is worth giving some
thought to the composition of those boards—particularly the boards of the
large, systemically important financial institutions (“SIFIs”) that have the
greatest potential to destabilize the financial system.203 Dodd-Frank
already requires that the boards of SIFIs establish risk committees with
specified levels of independence and expertise,204 but this Article will
explore more radical changes. One policy that might institutionalize otherregarding voices on SIFI boards would be to require such institutions to
dedicate a critical mass of board seats to publicly-elected or
administratively-appointed figures representing the public’s interest in
financial stability.205 Such public directors could “restrain[] self-interest
run amok in the corporate inner circles . . . [as well as] counter the natural
inclination of those at the summit of the corporate hierarchy to form self-

201. Awrey et al., supra note 10, at 34.
202. Research suggests that immoral behavior is encouraged by “break[ing] up
decisions into parts so most individuals were only responsible for moving the decision
forward and could not claim ultimate responsibility for an action.” ZAK, supra note 21, at
261; see also Amir & Lobel, supra note 147, at 2134-35. This type of thinking informs the
recommendation of the U.K. Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards, which
recommends that a new “Senior Persons Regime” be implemented so that “key
responsibilities within banks are assigned to specific individuals, who are made fully and
unambiguously aware of those responsibilities and made to understand that they will be held
to account for how they carry them out.” U.K. PARLIAMENTARY COMMITTEE ON BANKING
STANDARDS, infra note 280, at 8-9.
203. This Article focuses on larger, systemically significant firms, rather than on
smaller, local institutions providing traditional retail banking products and services, because
the former are far more likely to endanger systemic stability. Omarova, supra note 47, at
456-57.
204. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform & Consumer Protection Act § 165(h), 12 U.S.C. §
5346 (2010).
205. In the broader corporate context, Fanto has explored at length the rationale for, and
the logistics of, requiring corporations to have a critical mass of public directors on their
boards. See James Fanto, Whistleblowing and the Public Director: Countering Corporate
Inner Circles, 83 OR. L. REV. 435, 490-540 (2004)(discussing the importance of corporate
boards comprising a critical mass of public directors).
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contained groups that are characterized by groupthink and other negative
group dynamics.”206 In many respects, this type of proposal mimics
McDonnell and Schwarcz’s proposal that “regulatory contrarians” be
embedded in financial regulatory agencies207— these “board contrarians”
would be an other-regarding voice forcing the rest of the board members to
“interact during the decision-making process with [people] with differing
backgrounds and biases, and . . . publicly defend their positions.”208 As
noted above, courts have already recognized that bank directors can
represent interests beyond those of their shareholders,209 and legislation like
Dodd-Frank already authorizes enhanced supervisory and prudential
standards for SIFIs.210 A requirement that the public interest be represented
on SIFI boards finds support in these precedents.
Admittedly, in large financial institutions, boards have limited
oversight over the day-to-day actions of senior managers and other
employees. It is thus key that those managers and employees also take
responsibility for the externalities that their actions could cause.211 A more
other-regarding board can set an example for how others should conduct
themselves,212 but merely setting an example is unlikely to be enough. As
per Stout’s model, clear instructions from authority are a key element in
creating a more prosocial culture,213 and any other-regarding example set
by the board will have little effect if managers give contrary instructions to
employees to prioritize self-interest. The next Subpart will therefore
consider more granular reforms, in an attempt to encourage certain key
financial institution employees to feel that more prosocial behavior is
required of them and of their colleagues.

206. Id. at 494.
207. Brett McDonnell & Daniel Schwarcz, Regulatory Contrarians, 89 N.C. L. REV.
1629 (2011).
208. Id. at 1647.
209. See supra note 198 and accompanying text (describing that several courts have
held that bank directors owe duties to stakeholders other than shareholders).
210. See, e.g., Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform & Consumer Protection Act § 115, 12
U.S.C. § 5325 (2010) (authorizing increased prudential supervisory standards for SIFIs).
211. “All actors, from the board down to the trader, need to know that when there is a
conflict between regulatory objectives and the pursuit of value that it is lawful and
legitimate to prioritize fair treatment or the avoidance of potential externalities.” Awrey et
al., supra note 10, at 42; see also Sepe & Whitehead, supra note 188 (discussing the
destabilizing potential of the activities of traders and other financial institution employees).
212. Michelle Harner, Corporate Culture and ERM 2 (U. Md. Legal Studies Research
Paper, Paper No. 2013-34, 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2289432.
213. STOUT, supra note 11, at 99.
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2. Reform of Compliance and Risk-Management Functions
While this Article argues that all financial sector employees need to
engage in other-regarding behavior, much of the grunt work associated
with minimizing industry externalities will fall on compliance personnel
(who provide advice and training on compliance with regulations and
professional and ethical standards)214 and risk-managers (who assess the
firm’s risk exposure and communicate their findings to senior
management).215 However, given that compliance personnel and riskmanagers do not directly generate profits for their employers, they often
lack clout within the firm.216 As such, the reforms discussed in this Subpart
will only succeed if senior management ensures the primacy and
independence of the risk-management and compliance functions.217 From
an institutional design perspective, compliance and risk-management
personnel should report directly to senior management, instead of reporting
to the heads of business units who may resent their “profit-killing”
efforts.218 Increases in compensation for compliance and risk-management
personnel would also communicate to the firm the importance that
management places on these functions. Regulators could encourage these
reforms by taking such institutional design matters into account when
discharging their supervisory task of assessing the adequacy of the
financial institution’s management structure.219
With support from senior management, compliance departments could
aid in the creation of a more other-regarding culture by developing codes of
ethical conduct that stress the importance of considering externalities –
these should be highly publicized, and compliance should be rewarded and
non-compliance addressed.220 To assist with enforcement, compliance

214. Fanto, supra note 34, at 16-19.
215. Rene M. Stulz, Risk Management Failures: What Are They and When Do They
Happen, 20 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 39, 39 (2008).
216. See David M. Driesen, Legal Theory Lessons From the Financial Crisis, 40 J.
CORP. L. 55, 72 (2014) (“[F]irms tend to pay more attention to its traders’ views . . . because
trading serves as a profit center.”).
217. See Fanto, supra note 34, at 21.
218. See FINANCIAL STABILITY FORUM, supra note 189, at 2. (discussing the importance
of independence and authority for risk-management personnel). In a similar vein, the U.K.
Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards has advocated for “individual and direct
lines of access and accountability to the board for the heads of the risk, compliance and
internal audit functions and much greater levels of protection for their independence . . . .”
U.K. Parliamentary Committee on Banking Standards, infra note 280, at 10.
219. For a synopsis of the risk assessment processes of financial regulators, see Mehrsa
Baradaran, Regulation by Hypothetical, 67 VAND. L. REV. 1247, 1275-76 (2014).
220. Michelle Harner, Corporate Culture and ERM, DIRECTOR NOTES (The Conference
Bd., New York, N.Y.), July 2013, at 2-3 . Compliance with these codes is more likely if the
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personnel could be directed to implement policies that allow for
whistleblowing with respect to persons who fail to comply with the codes221
(perhaps by taking outsize trading risks or by speciously valuing firm
assets).222 The purpose of these codes goes beyond creating a basis for
disciplinary action, however: they are also intended to serve an educative
function by promoting a culture where compliance with the norm of
indirect other-regarding behavior is seen as a primary motivator, and the
shared responsibility of all financial institution employees.223 In particular,
these educative efforts should stress that being a steward for financial
stability is an important responsibility specifically conferred on those who
work in the financial industry – thus maintaining the sense of prestige and
importance that seems to motivate many in the industry.224
Risk-management personnel can also play an important role in
mitigating negative externalities caused by financial institution activities,
but they will need to reorient their perspective somewhat in order to do so.
At present, risk managers focus on the potential losses of the firm (or a
division of the firm),225 but they could also be directed to assess – to the
best of their knowledge – any risks being created for the financial system as
a whole.226 Information about these risks would then be reported to senior
management, who ideally would then make decisions aimed at minimizing
codes are coupled with policies that designate individuals to oversee the entire life-cycle of
a financial product or trading portfolio. See supra note 203.
221. Harner discusses the possibility of implementing such processes in Michelle
Harner, The Potential Cost and Value of ERM, Director Notes (The Conference Bd., New
York, N.Y.), Mar. 1, 2013, at 3.
222. See, e.g., supra Part II.C (discussing examples of destabilizing behaviors by
JPMorgan in 2012).
223. See Fanto, supra note 34, at 18-19. Bandes notes that norm-creation is a dynamic
and social process, rather than an individualized one. Bandes, supra note 21, at 225.
224. The literature on changing social norms suggests that such efforts will be more
successful if they reinforce rather than undermine the identities of their peers. Short, supra
note 23, at 506. In her ethnography of Wall Street, Ho emphasizes that many in the industry
view themselves as bearing the vital and difficult burden of purveying the capital “that
forms the foundations and enables the growth and expansion of our largest corporations and
public and private works.” Ho, supra note 25, at 27. This sentiment seems to inform
Goldman Sachs’ CEO Lloyd Blankfein’s infamous statement that banks are “doing God’s
work.” Dealbook, Blankfein Says He’s Just Doing ‘God’s Work’, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9,
2009, http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2009/11/09/goldman-chief-says-he-is-just-doing-godswork/.
225. As Admati and Hellwig have noted, “the banks’ interests in measuring and
managing risks are not the same as the public interest in having a safe financial
system . . . .” ADMATI & HELLWIG, supra note 195, at 184.
226. Of course, firms are not able to assess all of the systemic risks they are creating, as
to do so would also require knowledge of their competitors’ strategies and how the various
institutions’ strategies would interact. As such, the role of regulators in monitoring systemic
risks remains vital. Allen, New Philosophy, supra note 42, at 184.
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such systemic risks (for example, by divesting assets deemed too risky,
rather than layering them with complex derivatives as occurred in the
London Whale episode).227 Importantly, this reconceptualization of the
risk-management function as systemic risk monitor would require changes
in the risk-management toolbox as well as a change in perspective.
“Value-at-risk” (usually known as “VaR”) models are the risk
assessment models currently favored by most financial institutions. A
number of criticisms, however, have been leveled at these models from a
systemic risk perspective. They are used to estimate, within a given
confidence level, the amount of money a firm, (or a business unit or a
portfolio) could lose on any given day.228 However, they are significantly
limited in that they focus on a firm’s risk in isolation,229 and also, because
they presume that historical data is somewhat predictive of what will
happen in the future, tend to discount low-probability “tail events” that fall
outside of their historical data set.230 But it is these very tail events, during
which it becomes clear that the firm’s risks are correlated and tightly
coupled with the risks of other financial institutions,231 which threaten
financial stability and are likely to generate the externalities that this
Article is seeking to mitigate. Although new and improved types of
modeling techniques have been developed (for example, Monte Carlo
models have been designed to more realistically simulate correlation
amongst risks),232 even these more sophisticated models are subject to
limitations in terms of their ability to predict the likelihood of a tail event
occurring.233
In addition, the usual critiques of the risk-modeling technologies
discussed above fail to discuss the problems that quantitative modeling
techniques pose for other-regarding behavior. Even the more sophisticated
results generated by Monte Carlo simulations “lack . . . human intuition.”234
Because the experience of empathy for others involves limbic regions of
the brain associated with emotional responses,235 to the extent that
227. See supra text accompanying note 111 (discussing the London Whale incident).
228. Kristin N. Johnson, Addressing Gaps in the Dodd-Frank Act: Directors’ Risk
Management Oversight Obligations,45 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 55, 69 (2011).
229. See, for example, Gerding, supra note 45, at 169-86 (discussing some of the
weaknesses of risk models).
230. Johnson, supra note 228, at 71.
231. Id. at 72.
232. Id. at 72-73.
233. Driesen notes that the accuracy of Monte Carlo models is dependent upon
knowledge of the distribution of probabilities of certain outcomes – knowledge that is
absent when dealing with complex systems like the financial system. Driesen, supra note
216, at 78.
234. Johnson, supra note 228, at 73.
235. Zak, supra note 21, at 266.
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processes are automated through mathematical models and no longer
filtered through the human brain, any empathy that might have colored
such judgments is lost. As such, this Article argues that risk-managers
should not be permitted to rely exclusively or unthinkingly on quantitative
modeling in assessing their risks.236 Scenario analysis and creative
thinking, performed by humans as well as computers, should become an
integral part of the risk-management function.237
C. Reform of Self-Regulation
The previous two Subparts have explored certain externally-mandated
reforms intended to inculcate a new culture in financial institutions. There
are limits on what externally-mandated reforms can achieve, however.238
As per Stout’s model, prosocial behavior flourishes in environments where
there are instructions from authority to act prosocially and beliefs that
others are acting prosocially. If the financial industry is disdainful of
external regulations (which it certainly seems to be at present),239 then
industry participants may not view such external regulations as legitimate
instructions from authority, nor will industry participants believe that
others are complying with those instructions.240 Instead, norms of otherregarding behavior are most likely to flourish under a regime of selfregulation. A self-regulatory authority is likely to have more credibility
with the industry than an external regulator,241 and because self-regulation
is intended to reflect the industry’s own standards, rather than externally
imposed regulation, it is more likely to engender beliefs that prosocial, pro236. Stulz has expressed a similar sentiment: “I conclude that the probabilities of large
losses are measured very imprecisely and that, as a consequence, companies should rely less
on estimates of such probabilities and pay more attention to the implications of large losses
for their survival.” Stulz, supra note 215, at 39.
237. For a discussion of how stress tests, war games, and other scenario analyses can
reduce excessive risk-taking, see Nizan Geslevich Packin, It’s (Not) All About The Money:
Using Behavioral Economics to Improve Regulation of Risk Management in Financial
Institutions, 15 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 419, 479-81 (2013).
238. Omarova, supra note 47, at 475.
239. See also Donald C. Langevoort, State of Mind and the Global Financial Crisis 17
(2013) (unpublished manuscript) (available at http://luc.edu/media/lucedu/law/centers/
investor/pdfs/langevoort.pdf) (discussing the psychological and cultural dimensions of the
financial crisis).
240. Fanto has noted that regulatory compliance could well be viewed by many brokerdealers as “something external, and not reflective of their own self-identity and selfdefinition, which are centered on their productive securities activities and the business
groups where they conduct these activities.” Fanto, supra note 34, at 21; see also
Dombalagian, supra note 12, at 498.
241. Education and persuasion by peers and insiders is more likely to be effective in
changing norms. Short, supra note 23, at 506.
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stability behavior is both expected and carried out by others in the industry.
Theoretically at least, self-regulation shows significant promise for
improving industry culture242 and could potentially displace some of the
stricter legal rules that run the risk of crowding out moral norms of otherregarding behavior.243
However, financial industry self-regulation would have to be
significantly reconceptualized to achieve a focus on financial stability. In
the United States, financial self-regulation has traditionally been very
prescriptive and addressed things like competency and character –
particularly in the context of relationships between industry personnel and
clients.244
While this type of self-regulation sometimes requires
professionals “to act beyond their self-interest[]” when acting for clients,245
it does not address behaviors that generate instability and thus harm a
broader group of persons with whom the professional has no direct
connection.246 Given the difficulty in delineating destabilizing behaviors
with any precision, it would be impossible to create any kind of
prescriptive industry code or compliance manual that sought to deal with
such destabilizing behaviors, and as such, any industry self-regulation
would have to leave significant discretion to industry participants
(particularly compliance departments) in determining what activities should
be permitted.
Unfortunately, this leaves us with something of a Catch-22. While
industry self-regulation is probably the best way to create a more otherregarding culture, the amount of discretion required in a financial stability
self-regulatory regime ensures that self-regulation that is not backed by a
genuine cultural change will effectively be deregulatory (or perversely
result in more selfish behavior, because the rubber stamp of self-regulation
has the potential to cause members of a profession to abdicate
responsibility for their own moral obligations).247 So how can the powers
242. This discussion is premised on the understanding that self-regulation would work
together with, rather than entirely supplant, traditional command-and-control regulation.
For a discussion of the division of labor between government and industry self-regulation in
the financial stability context, see Omarova, supra note 47, at 438-42.
243. Fanto, supra note 34, at 31-32.
244. Steven A. Ramirez, The Professional Obligations of Securities Brokers Under
Federal Law: An Antidote for Bubbles?, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 527, 536, 538 (2002). This type
of self-regulation has evolved to address the significant opportunities for malfeasance that
arise when firm employees are dealing with cash and personal property. Fanto, supra note
34, at 20.
245. Andrew F. Tuch, The Self-Regulation of Investment Bankers, 83 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 101, 111 (2014).
246. See Omarova, supra note 47, at 438 (discussing systematic risk created by the
financial services industry).
247. David DeSteno, Good Groups Can Lead to Bad Apples, PSYCHOLOGY TODAY, July
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that be in the financial industry be convinced to spearhead a more otherregarding culture? Omarova, drawing analogies from the nuclear power
and chemical industries, has concluded that a more other-regarding
financial industry culture will only develop if the industry sees itself as a “
‘community of fate’ whose future prosperity depend[s] upon its ability to
impose collective self-restraint on its members’ profit-seeking activities in
the name of public safety.”248 Essentially, unless there is a credible threat
to financial institutions’ existence or profitability, industry leaders will not
agitate for cultural change.
The financial industry might feel an existential threat if senior
managers of financial institutions genuinely believed that they would not
be able to partake of government assistance in the event of a future crisis.
But, in reality, this type of threat is not credible. Even though Dodd-Frank
asserts that there will be no more bailouts,249 bailouts are likely to remain a
political necessity in times of crisis, and financial institutions know this.250
The only threat that is likely to motivate financial institutions, then, is the
fear of significant regulatory interference,251 especially if such regulation
has the potential to significantly reduce profits.252 Along these lines,
William Dudley, the President and CEO of the Federal Reserve Bank of
New York reportedly unnerved some in the industry when he said in a
recent speech:253
[I]f those of you here today as stewards of these large financial
institutions do not do your part in pushing forcefully for change
across the industry, then bad behavior will undoubtedly persist.
If that were to occur, the inevitable conclusion will be reached

13, 2011, http://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/out-character/201107/good-groups-canlead-bad-apples.
248. Omarova, supra note 47, at 443, 446.
249. The preamble to the Act describes it as an Act “to protect the American taxpayer
by ending bailouts. . . .” Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 12
U.S.C. Preamble (2010).
250. Adam J. Levitin, In Defense of Bailouts, 99 GEO. L.J. 435, 439 (2011).
251. Omarova, supra note 47, at 453. Examples of such regulatory changes include
breaking up the big banks, or introducing a precautionary review procedure for financial
institution trading strategies and product development. For a discussion of the former, see
SIMON JOHNSON & JAMES KWAK, 13 BANKERS: THE WALL STREET TAKEOVER AND THE NEXT
FINANCIAL MELTDOWN 214-17 (2010). For a discussion of the latter, see Saule T. Omarova,
License To Deal: Mandatory Approval of Complex Financial Products, 90 WASH. U. L.
REV. 63 (2012).
252. Omarova, supra note 47, at 486-87.
253. Peter Eavis, Regulator Tells Banks to Clean Up Bad Behavior or Face Downsizing,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20, 2014, http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/10/20/regulator-tells-banksto-clean-up-bad-behavior-or-face-downsizing/.

ARTICLE 4 (ALLEN).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2015]

6/16/15 11:49 AM

THE PATHOLOGIES OF BANKING BUSINESS AS USUAL

909

that your firms are too big and complex to manage effectively. In
that case, financial stability concerns would dictate that your
firms need to be dramatically downsized and simplified so they
can be managed effectively.254
Despite Dudley’s strong words, though, the political power of
financial institutions suggests that, at least at present, there is no real
credible threat of significant regulatory reform. Inevitably, we are left with
the notion that a wholesale change in financial culture cannot be achieved
until the political winds shift after the next financial crisis.255 This Article
thus argues strenuously that the momentum of the next crisis must not be
squandered: the response to that crisis must ensure that the leaders of
financial institutions genuinely fear that if they do not adopt far-reaching
self-regulatory reform and inculcate a more other-regarding culture, then
they will face laws that impose significant structural reform on them. In
the interim, however, the externally-mandated reforms explored in Parts A
and B of this Section should be pursued as potentially effective (albeit
more limited) means of improving financial industry culture.
III.

LIMITATIONS OF OTHER MEANS OF ADDRESSING THE
PATHOLOGIES

Changing an industry’s culture is an enormous undertaking. It is not
surprising, then, that many proponents of financial reform prefer to focus
on the more discrete tools of criminal prosecutions, private litigation,
regulatory supervision and regulatory enforcement to promote financial
stability. However, as this section will explore, these traditional tools are
limited in what they can achieve when dealing with behavior that is not
fraudulent, but evinces a disregard for the consequences of financial
instability for others. Accordingly, this Section emphasizes that broader
cultural reform is a necessary complement to the more traditional
approaches to financial stability regulation.
This section also helps explain why financial institutions (and their
employees) are rarely punished for causing financial instability. Criminal
law and private litigation, for example, are limited in their ability to punish
destabilizing behaviors largely because of the difficulties associated with

254. Dudley, supra note 131.
255. Depressingly, we probably will not have to wait too long for this: JPMorgan CEO
Jamie Dimon testified his belief that financial crises will occur every five to seven years.
Sewell Chan, Voices That Dominate Wall Street Take a Meeker Tone on Capitol Hill, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 14, 2010, at B5.

ARTICLE 4 (ALLEN).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

910

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

6/16/15 11:49 AM

[Vol. 17:3

establishing moral culpability and causation.256 Financial instability arises
not from the actions of one person or firm, but as a result of the aggregation
and interaction of actions by a very large number of actors, magnified by
correlations and feedback loops.257 Once a crisis has occurred, it is very
difficult to pinpoint who is actually responsible for causing the instability,
and what proportion of the fault lies at their door.258 In addition, many
people who suffer as a result of financial instability do so not because they
contracted with a financial institution, but because they are unable to get
credit or lose their job as a result of the general economic malaise that
follows a financial crisis. It is very difficult to demonstrate with any
precision that one person or firm is responsible for these individualized
harms.
With regard to the difficulty of establishing moral culpability, there
will be some situations where complexity and cognitive failures entirely
prevent financial institution personnel from appreciating the potential of
their activities to damage financial stability and thus harm others.259 In
such situations, any cause of action that requires a demonstration of moral
culpability will certainly fail. However, this Article has already made the
case that most destabilizing behaviors entail both cognitive and moral
failures. Moral failures – in the form of failures of indirect other-regarding
behavior – often contribute to financial instability, but they are different in
kind from the more direct failure of dishonesty on which most white collar
criminal prosecutions are predicated.260 Because neither the law nor society
at large expects complete abnegation of self-interest – indeed, some level
of self-interest is necessary to survival261 – it is very difficult to identify
with any precision the tipping point at which acceptable self-interest
becomes an immoral failure of other-regarding behavior.
This is a fortiori the case in the context of collective action problems
(like over-leveraged participation in asset price bubbles, and the
corresponding fire sales that occur on the downside of the leverage

256. See supra note 106 and accompanying text (discussing causation and the scienter
requirement in 10b-5 claims).
257. Awrey et al., supra note 10, at 33-34.
258. David Zaring, Litigating the Financial Crisis, 100 VA. L. REV. 1433 (2014).
259. See Langevoort, supra note 17, at 1218-20.
260. STUART P. GREEN, LYING, CHEATING AND STEALING: A MORAL THEORY OF WHITE
COLLAR CRIME 149 (2007).
261. “Total self-restraint may also be destructive to markets.” Frankel, supra note 32, at
92; “Self-interest . . . has its place as a factor shaping human behavior, but this place is
alongside the moral forces that bind the individual to the community.” Richard M.
Coughlin, Whose Morality? Which Community? What Interests? Socio-economic and
Communitarian Perspectives, 25 J. SOCIO-ECONOMICS 137 (1996).
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cycle),262 when individuals have such strong incentives to act in a selfinterested way that it is difficult to label their behavior as immorally selfinterested, notwithstanding that their collective behavior generates
suboptimal outcomes for everyone.263 While the financial industry
generally appreciates that financial stability is best served by not using
leverage to bid up the price of assets beyond any reasonable assessment of
their value or dumping assets in fire sales that are destructive of asset
values system-wide,264 once these types of behaviors become prevalent, it
can become too costly for financial industry personnel not to participate.
However, as Hockett has identified, financial stability-related collective
action problems often worsen over time, with each round of self-interested
action taking society further away from the desired goal of financial
stability.265 In the earliest rounds of a collective action problem, the
disparity between self-interest and other-regarding behavior is not as
pronounced, and it could thus be reasonable to expect a small sacrifice
from the financial industry (in the form of other-regarding coordination)
that would nip the incipient collective action problem in the bud.266 Again,
however, it is difficult to identify the point at which the collective action
problem becomes so bad that it is no longer reasonable to expect people to
make sacrifices for the sake of coordination.
The remainder of this section will explore in greater detail why
criminal law and private litigation are so ill-suited to holding people
accountable for failures of indirect other-regarding behavior. It will also
explain why, while regulation should certainly play an important role in
addressing destabilizing behavior, its efficacy is limited to some extent.
Finally, it will briefly explain why market discipline is not helpful in
addressing destabilizing behaviors.

262. Robert Hockett, Recursive Collective Action Problems: The Structure of
Procyclicality in Financial Markets, Monetary Systems, Macroeconomies and Formally
Similar Contexts, 3 J. FIN. PERSP. (forthcoming 2015) (available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2239849).
263. Id.
264. Of course this presumes some level of cognitive awareness of the consequences of
collective action problems. It is difficult to predict the exact consequences of such problems
ex ante, but Zingales notes that people who have studied economics and finance are
generally able to identify the outcome that is in the collective best interest of all persons
involved. Luigi Zingales, Do Business Schools Incubate Criminals?, BLOOMBERG VIEW
(July 16, 2012), http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2012-07-16/do-business-schoolsincubate-criminals-.
265. Hockett, supra note 262.
266. “[W]e can expect most people will be willing to make at least a small personal
sacrifice . . . in order to behave prosocially.” STOUT, supra note 11, at 117.
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A. Criminal Law
To some extent, the dearth of criminal prosecutions in the wake of the
Financial Crisis is a result of the evidentiary difficulties (and political
economies) associated with prosecuting white-collar crimes.267 However,
this Article asserts that the bigger issue is that many of the behaviors that
destabilized the financial system and caused the Financial Crisis do not fit
into our traditional frameworks for criminal liability. While this Article
appreciates that, at a gut level, many people want to see someone held
accountable for the misery occasioned by the Crisis,268 it asserts that many
of the destabilizing behaviors that brought the world economy to its knees
are, and should remain, unpunishable.
Federal criminal law, in its current form, is not designed to address
non-fraudulent destabilizing behavior. Federal wire, mail and securities
fraud statutes all have scienter requirements that purport to require some
type of dishonest mental state: wire fraud requires a defendant to have
“devised or intend[ed] to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud, or for
obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses,
representations, or promises.”269 The crime of mail fraud has similar
elements.270 The prohibition on securities fraud makes it unlawful to either
“employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud”; “make any untrue
statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in
order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under
which they were made, not misleading”; or “engage in any act, practice, or
course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit
upon any person”; in each case in connection with the purchase or sale of a
security.271 By focusing on deception, the plain language of each of these
fraud statutes indicates that it does not apply to honest but self-interested

267. For a discussion of these issues, see Geoffrey M. Gilchrist, The Special Problem of
Banks and Crime, 85. U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 1 (2014) (“the non-prosecution of bankers is often
explained by lack of evidence or the difficulty of white-collar prosecutions generally.”);
Rakoff, supra note 97, at 4 (proving fraudulent intent by executives has been very difficult);
Zaring, supra note 258, at 1435-37 (discussing the pros and cons of using white collar crime
to regulate corporate misconduct). This Article does not enter into the debate on whether
the Department of Justice has been too lenient in prosecuting fraud committed in connection
with the Financial Crisis. The point made by this Article is that the most dangerous
destabilizing behaviors do not constitute fraud, and are not properly the subject of any
criminal prohibition.
268. The public often desires the “closure and certainty” provided by criminal
punishment. Miriam Baer, Choosing Punishment, 92 B.U. L. REV. 577, 636 (2012).
269. 18 U.S.C. § 1343.
270. 18 U.S.C. § 1341.
271. 17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5.
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behavior.272 Although courts have in some instances interpreted the
scienter requirement for these fraud provisions as being satisfied by mere
recklessness,273 such decisions “swim against a considerable tide of cases
insisting on knowledge or intent for white-collar and regulatory crime
offenses carrying significant prison sentences.”274
Given that existing federal criminal law does not squarely address
destabilizing behavior that lacks a deceitful mental state, this raises the
question of whether a criminal offense should be created for this kind of
behavior (perhaps with a shorter prison sentence than crimes committed
with knowledge or intent). Although there is much scholarly debate about
why society chooses to criminalize behavior, there is some consensus
around the “retributivist” view, which posits that actions are criminalized
because society has an interest in seeing morally culpable behavior
punished.275 It follows from the retributivist reasoning that imposing
“punishment on people who were not at fault, or . . . in a way that was
disproportionate to their fault, would be unjust.”276 In other words,
criminal punishment should only be doled out when offenders deserve such
punishment because they have acted in a morally culpable way.277 In
criminal fraud cases, for example, the moral failure that is usually cited as
“deserving” punishment is dishonesty.278 Because of the impossibility of
clearly demonstrating the moral culpability inherent in a failure of indirect
other-regarding behavior,279 this Article posits that that the perpetrators of
272. Other criminal offenses that pertain particularly to financial institutions and their
employees also tend to cover dishonest acts, rather than honest but destabilizing activities.
For example, when Congress enacted 12 U.S.C. § 1833a to give prosecutors more latitude in
pursuing bank misconduct, it only included crimes that involved some type of element of
dishonesty. All of the new criminal offenses introduced by Dodd-Frank similarly target
direct, identifiable and dishonest conduct, like disclosure failures and failure to register. See
Tiffany M. Joslyn, Criminal Provisions in the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform & Consumer
Protection Act, NEW FED. INITIATIVES PROJECT, (The Federalist Soc’y for Law & Pub.
Policy Studies, Wash., D.C.), Dec. 10, 2010, http://www.fed-soc.org/doclib/20101210
_NFIPCrimProvisionsinDoddFrank.pdf (containing a catalogue of Dodd-Frank’s new
crimes).
273. Samuel W. Buell, What Is Securities Fraud?, 61 DUKE L. J. 511, 557-58 (2011).
274. Id. at 560.
275. Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 453,
455 (1997).
276. GREEN, supra note 260, at 22.
277. Green argues that white collar offenses constitute crimes when the impugned
behavior can be characterized as cheating, deception, stealing, coercion and exploitation,
disloyalty, promise-breaking, and disobedience. Id. at 53-127. All of these types of moral
wrongfulness can be subsumed under the heading of dishonesty.
278. Id. at 149. Although it should be noted that “criminal philosophy has yet to distill,
in a concrete and usable fashion, an objective means for identifying the . . . nature of
conduct that ‘deserves” punishment.’” Baer, supra note 268, at 596.
279. See supra text accompanying notes 259-261. Practically speaking, criminal
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non-fraudulent destabilizing behaviors do not deserve to be punished with
criminal penalties.
Some disagree with this conclusion, and argue for the imposition of
criminal offenses that penalize financial institution employees who
honestly, but recklessly disregard financial stability.280
Criminal
recklessness offenses typically include elements that reflect a cognizant
disregard for societal norms about what is risky: those who ignore the
potential consequences of those risks for others are seen as deserving
punishment.281 However, in the complicated context of the financial
system, there exists no broad social consensus about the types of risktaking that violate social norms at the time such risks are taken282 (although
with the benefit of hindsight, we can usually say which risks turned out
badly).283 Norms about financial risk-taking are not sufficiently precise ex
ante that reckless failure to comply with such norms evinces a disregard for
others that “deserves” to be criminalized.284
There are also other, non-retributivist rationales that have been
advanced for criminalizing behavior – amongst these, deterrence is of
particular relevance to this Article (given that it seeks ways of preventing
destabilizing behavior).285 Optimal deterrence theory posits that when

prosecutors are better suited to navigating black-and-white issues like lying and cheating
than this more nuanced concept of failure of indirect other-regarding behavior by way of
undue risk taking. Baer, supra note 268, at 635-36.
280. For example, the U.K. Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards recently
proposed new criminal offence for reckless mismanagement of financial institutions.
PARLIAMENTARY COMMISSION ON BANKING STANDARDS, CHANGING BANKING FOR GOOD,
2013-14, H.C. 175-I, at 10 (U.K.).
281. Jed S. Rakoff, Conjoining “Recklessness” in Securities Fraud Cases to Moral
Culpability, 44 LOY. U. CHI. L. J. 1447, 1456 (2013). The Model Penal Code provides that:
A person acts recklessly with respect to a material element of an offense when
he consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material
element exists or will result from his conduct. The risk must be of such a nature
and degree that, considering the nature and purpose of the actor’s conduct and
the circumstances known to him, its disregard involves a gross deviation from
the standard of conduct that a law-abiding person would observe in the actor’s
situation.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(c) (2011).
282. Rakoff, supra note 281, at 1453.
283. For a discussion of hindsight bias, see Mitu Gulati, et al., Fraud By Hindsight, 98
NW. U. L. REV. 773, 775 (2004).
284. Buell notes that in the criminal context, we cannot “easily justify ex ante
vagueness, with large gaps to be filled in terms of specific behaviors entirely ex post.”
Buell, supra note 273, at 521.
285. Criminalizing behavior is usually justified by one or more of the following
rationales: “deterrence, incapacitation, rehabilitation and desert.” Paul H. Robinson,
Criminal Law Scholarship: Three Illusions, 2 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN L. 287, 290 (2001).
It should be noted, though, that some are skeptical about the deterrence justification for
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faced with a criminal sanction, a potential offender will calculate the
likelihood of detection and the cost of being punished if detected, weigh
these against the benefits of transgression, and make a rational decision as
to whether or not it is worthwhile to engage in the activity.286
Unfortunately, a lack of clarity about what is and is not acceptable behavior
constrains the efficacy of any deterring sanction,287 and destabilizing
behaviors defy the creation of clear criminal sanctions. Many potentially
destabilizing behaviors are necessary – at least to some degree – to the
proper functioning of the financial system. They should not be the subjects
of an outright criminal ban.288 Instead, it is the self-interested misuse of
these activities that we wish to prevent, but this Article has already
explored in depth the difficulty in delineating a bright-line ex ante rule as to
the self-interest that is acceptable, and the self-interest that we wish to
deter.289 As such, criminal law will not function as an effective deterrent of
non-fraudulent, but destabilizing, financial activities.
B. Private Litigation
In some contexts, “civil liability for extremely poor judgment . . . has
filled gaps that the criminal law leaves behind.”290 But private litigation is
also largely unsuitable for punishing non-fraudulent behavior that has a
diffuse impact on society at large. Most of the people who suffer in the
negative economic conditions that follow financial crises will be prevented
from bringing claims against the financial institutions that have generated
the instability, because to establish standing, “the plaintiff must establish
injury-in-fact; [and] the plaintiff must show a connection between the
injury and the conduct alleged.”291 The law generally does not view pure

criminalizing behavior: Baer argues “[d]eterrence may well be invoked as a justification for
punishment, but lay intuitions about culpability and moral outrage appear to outweigh the
factors that ought to matter most under a deterrence-based scheme.” Baer, supra note 268, at
588.
286. Short, supra note 23, at 496. Optimal deterrence theory does not enjoy universal
support, however - it has been criticized on behavioral economic grounds, which call into
question whether people actually make accurate assessments of the likelihood and costs of
punishment. Id. at 496-97. These concerns are even more salient when dealing with
something as complex as financial risk-taking, further undermining the case for deterrence
in this context.
287. Id. at 505.
288. See supra text accompanying notes 42-43 (discussing the necessity of some level
of innovation and leverage).
289. See supra text accompanying notes 261-266 (discussing the necessity of some level
of self-interest).
290. Christine Hurt, The Duty to Manage Risk, 39 J. CORP. L. 253, 257 (2014).
291. Heidi Mandanis Schooner, Private Enforcement of Systemic Risk Regulation, 43
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economic loss as a compensable injury,292 so the injury-in-fact element is
an insurmountable hurdle for most potential plaintiffs in this context.293
Furthermore, this Article has already explored how difficult it is to attribute
causation of financial instability to any one financial institution,294 and so
the requirement to show a causal connection between injurious conduct and
injury will also prevent most potential plaintiffs from having standing.
It is possible that financial institutions and their employees might
nonetheless be deterred from engaging in destabilizing behavior if they
faced a real threat of litigation from those who do have standing,
notwithstanding that any damages awarded in such claims would not come
close to encompassing the full amount of harm externalized by financial
institutions in a crisis.295 As the law currently stands, though, even
individuals who are likely to have standing (either because they are
shareholders in a financial institution, or because they have transacted
directly with a financial institution) face major challenges in punishing
destabilizing behaviors. For example, civil common law fraud claims
require some demonstration of actual dishonesty (in the sense that the
maker of the statement knew or believed the statement to be false).296
Securities fraud claims297 only require a demonstration of recklessness (a
lesser standard of culpability than dishonesty),298 but as the previous Part
explored, recklessness is very difficult to establish in a context where there
is no ex ante societal consensus about which levels of financial risk-taking
are acceptable, and which are not.299 As such, fraud claims have limited
applicability to destabilizing behaviors, and are often used to address
attempts to cover-up previous destabilizing behaviors (once the damage has
CREIGHTON L. REV. 993, 1009 (2010).
292. Armour & Gordon, supra note 199, at 15.
293. Courts have also ruled that there is no implied private right of action to enforce
prudential regulations. Schooner, supra note 291, at 1008-09. Schooner has argued that a
“qui tam” process should be implemented that would allow private plaintiffs to enforce
macroprudential regulations against financial institutions. Id. at 1011-17. This proposal is
intriguing, and has the potential to improve enforcement of existing macroprudential
regulations. However, by definition, it will only address behaviors that have been identified
ex ante as problematic for financial stability—it would not impact what financial institutions
do in the space beyond regulation.
294. See supra text accompanying notes 256-258.
295. See Armour & Gordon, supra note 199, at 36 (discussing the limitations of tort
remedies in the context of systemic harm).
296. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 526 (1977).
297. These claims are brought pursuant to 17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5.
298. The Supreme Court has noted, without expressly deciding the issue, that all circuit
courts have allowed plaintiffs to plead that a defendant acted recklessly. Tellabs, Inc. v
Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. 551 U.S. 308, 319-20 (2007). Of course, plaintiffs can also
plead that the defendant acted intentionally.
299. See supra text accompanying notes 282-284.
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been done), rather than the behaviors themselves.300 Alternatively, a
plaintiff could try to fit destabilizing behaviors into the negligence law
framework, but such claims will only succeed if negligent conduct is a
“substantial factor in bringing about the harm.”301 Proving such causation
is likely to be very difficult, given that financial instability generally arises
from the collective actions of an entire industry.302
One private cause of action that might seem to hold some promise for
addressing financial instability would be a breach of fiduciary duty suit
against financial institution directors, alleging failure to monitor
destabilizing behaviors.303 However, the Delaware courts (and most major
U.S. financial institutions are incorporated in Delaware) tend to be very
deferential to boards, and have ruled that boards will only be subject to
oversight liability when there is “a sustained or systematic failure of the
board to exercise oversight—such as an utter failure to attempt to assure a
reasonable information and reporting system exists”.304 This is very
difficult to prove, with the result that plaintiffs rarely succeed in
establishing oversight liability.305 Furthermore, courts have typically held
that such a duty to monitor applies to legal and compliance risks, but not to
business risks.306 This approach largely precludes holding boards liable for
flawed oversight of risk-management policies. It is, of course, open to the
courts (or legislators) to reinterpret fiduciary duties to include a duty to
monitor risk-management decisions,307 but it is very unlikely that they will
do so: that would be tantamount to abandoning the long-standing “business
judgment rule” presumption with respect to financial risk-taking.308
Furthermore, even assuming that courts were willing to effectively
abrogate the business judgment rule in this context, it is not clear that doing

300. See, for example, the securities fraud claims that have been brought against
JPMorgan in the wake of the London Whale episode, discussed in the text accompanying
note 126.
301. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 431 (1977).
302. In one case arising out of the Financial Crisis, the jury agreed that some kind of
wrong had been perpetrated, but were unable to identify any one person as the single party
responsible. SEC v. Stoker, 865 F. Supp. 2d 457 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); Rakoff, supra note 281,
at 1456.
303. These claims are known as “Caremark claims,” after the case In re Caremark Int’l
Inc. Deriv. Litig., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996). Such types of claims have been
characterized as a last resort. Hurt, supra note 290, at 269.
304. In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Deriv. Litig. 698 A.2d at 971.
305. Armour & Gordon, supra note 199, at 33.
306. Hurt, supra note 290, at 282.
307. For example, Armour & Gordon have proposed that “those controlling a systemic
firm fac[e] liability to their firm for conflicts of interest or negligence as regards decisions
capable of contributing to systemic risk.” Armour & Gordon, supra note 199, at 29.
308. Id. at 289-90.
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so would be advisable. Such a duty to ensure prudent risk-management
would require courts “to determine what amount of risk-taking is excessive
for a given firm at the point of time the decision was made”:309 just as with
recklessness,310 such a determination invites hindsight bias and a confusion
of bad outcomes with bad acts.
C. Command-and-Control Regulation
Given that the private causes of action in our legal system are illsuited to punishing the pathologies of banking business as usual, this Part
will examine the role that command-and-control financial regulation can
play. Financial regulators seem the most appropriate candidates to identify
ex ante activities that are likely to be destabilizing and to take steps to
either control or prohibit those activities. An institution’s failure to comply
with such regulations can then be punished with civil sanctions,311 even if it
cannot be proved that the consequences of the offending actions were
actually destabilizing, or morally culpable. I have previously written
regarding the benefits of such proactive legislation,312 but I nonetheless
recognize its limits: given the complexity of the financial system, it would
be impossible for regulators to anticipate, catalogue and regulate ex ante
every type of behavior that could prove destabilizing.313 Even if regulators
could do so, there are still resource constraints that limit their ability to
supervise financial institutions and enforce their regulations.314
Furthermore, such regulations would remain susceptible to arbitrage by
financial institutions (at least for so long as those institutions were
motivated purely by norms of short-term self-interest). Finally, regulators
are not always paragons of public service—their willingness to promote
financial stability is also limited at times.
In the lead-up to the Financial Crisis, for example, financial regulators
failed to take steps to protect consumers from unsavory lending practices,
which would have reduced the number of residential mortgage loans made,
taking some air out of the real estate and MBS bubbles. In particular, the
Federal Reserve failed to use its power under the Home Ownership and
Equity Protection Act to create uniform federal mortgage lending rules to

309. Id. at 260.
310. See supra text accompanying notes 282-284.
311. The available regulatory sanctions include civil penalties, cease-and-desist orders,
orders for suspension, removal and prohibition, as well as less formal regulatory pressure.
Schooner, supra note 291, at 1005-1006.
312. Allen, New Philosophy, supra note 42.
313. Armour & Gordon, supra note 199, at 27.
314. Dudley, supra note 131; Schooner, supra note 291, at 1001.
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prohibit predatory lending practices,315 and the OCC and OTS sought to
preempt any state efforts to reign in consumer abuses by banks.316
Essentially, the regulators prioritized bank profitability over how banks
dealt with their customers.317 To some extent this can be attributed to
cognitive failure by the banking regulators: they failed to fully appreciate
that ignoring consumer protection would lead to poor quality mortgages,
which would then be securitized with ramifications both for the safety and
soundness of individual institutions, and for the economy as a whole.318
But banking regulators had been alerted to these issues. Consumer
advocates continually complained to the regulators, and within the Federal
Reserve Governor Gramlich was a vocal advocate for improving oversight
over consumer protection issues.319 Furthermore, in 2007, Professors Engel
and McCoy made explicit the destabilizing potential of these failures of
consumer protection.320 The regulators’ decision to ignore these warnings
can be partially attributed to moral failings: either because regulators had
unconsciously internalized the self-interested worldview of the financial
industry,321 or because regulators sought a conflict-free life by avoiding
complaint from the financial sector,322 they chose to allow consumer abuses
315. The Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act, enacted in 1994, gave the Federal
Reserve the power to enact industry-wide rules to reign in abusive mortgage practices. The
rules promulgated by the Fed in 2001 only covered 1% of all mortgages. In fact, the Fed did
not use its HOEPA authority to issue rules that required most lenders to ensure the
borrower’s ability to repay until 2008, after the subprime bubble had already burst. FCIC
Report, supra note 71, at 77–94.
316. Id. at 96, 112.
317. See Heidi Mandanis Schooner, The Role of Central Banks in Bank Supervision in
the United States and the United Kingdom, 28 BROOK. J. OF INT’L L. 411, 427 (2003)
(“[T]he Federal Reserve’s . . . regulatory role remains focused on safety and soundness and
not on other goals of financial regulation, such as consumer protection.”).
318. See generally Hearing on “Consumer Protections in Financial Services: Past
Problems, Future Solutions” Before the. S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban
Affairs, 111th Cong. 11-23 (2009) (statement of Patricia A. McCoy, George J. & Helen M.
England Professor of Law, Univ. of Conn. Sch. of Law); see also Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr.,
The Financial Service Industry’s Misguided Quest to Undermine the Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau, 31 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 881, 926 (2012); Adam J. Levitin,
Hydraulic Regulation: Regulating Credit Markets Upstream, 26 YALE J. ON REG. 143, 152
(2009).
319. FCIC Report, supra note 71, at 95.
320. Engel & McCoy, supra note 73.
321. For a discussion of cognitive capture of regulators, see Willem H. Buiter, Central
Banks and Financial Crises, MAINTAINING STABILITY IN A CHANGING FINANCIAL SYSTEM: A
SYMPOSIUM SPONSORED BY THE FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY 495, 601 (Fed.
Res. Bank of Kan. City, 2009); James Kwak, Cultural Capture and the Financial Crisis, in
PREVENTING CAPTURE: SPECIAL INTEREST INFLUENCE IN REGULATION, AND HOW TO LIMIT IT
(Daniel Carpenter & David A. Moss eds., 2013).
322. With regard to the desire of regulators to avoid criticism and political intervention,
see DAVID ANDREW SINGER, REGULATING CAPITAL: SETTING STANDARDS FOR THE
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to continue.
Even after problematic behavior has occurred, regulators have not
consistently addressed institutional wrong-doing: there has been much
criticism of the SEC, for example, for not bringing “failure to supervise”
actions against the large financial institutions in the wake of the Financial
Crisis.323 And as the JPMorgan “London Whale” episode illustrates,
unreliable regulatory supervision of institutions persists even after the
Crisis.324 Given these demonstrated limitations of financial regulators and
command-and-control regulation, it would be imprudent to rely exclusively
on them to ensure financial stability.
D. Incentives Regulation
Another potential regulatory avenue for addressing destabilizing
behavior is to structure incentives (including by way of compensation
reform, and the implementation of Pigouvian taxes) to encourage better
behavior amongst financial industry personnel.325 This Article has already
explored some of the difficulties inherent in using incentives regulation to
improve financial stability.326 Essentially, the concern is that it is very
difficult to precisely calibrate incentives to produce the desired
behavior327—particularly because of the difficulty of identifying, in
advance, the benchmark level of desirable risk-taking for financial
institutions that should be incentivized—and incentives that are not
perfectly targeted can have unintended harmful consequences.328 There is
INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM 22 (2007).
323. See Aruna Viswanatha, Analysis: SEC Targets Low-Level Bankers, Spares Top
Execs, REUTERS (Nov. 15, 2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/11/15/us-secenforcement-idUSTRE7AE2BN20111115. “Failure to supervise” actions are brought by the
SEC pursuant to Section 15(b)(6) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, for an
individual’s failure to comply with the obligation under Section 15(b)(4)(E) “reasonably to
supervise, with a view to preventing violations of [the securities laws], another person who
commits such a violation, if such other person is subject to his supervision.” 15 U.S.C. §
78o(b)(4)(E). It should be noted, however, that such “failure to supervise” actions would not
cover inordinate risk-taking, as this is not a violation of the securities laws.
324. See supra text accompanying notes 128-130.
325. See, e.g., with respect to compensation, Lucian A. Bebchuk & Holger Spamann,
Regulating Bankers’ Pay, 98 GEO. L.J. 247 (2010). For a discussion of Pigouvian taxes in
the financial sector, see Douglas A. Shackelford, Daniel N. Shaviro & Joel Slemrod,
Taxation and the Financial Sector, 63 NATIONAL TAX JOURNAL 781 (2010).
326. See supra text accompanying notes 189-190.
327. See supra note 189 and accompanying text.
328. For example, corporate governance reforms that sought to align managers’ interests
with stockholders’ interests by granting managers more equity-based compensation,
inadvertently caused mangers to be much more short-termist in their outlook. STOUT, supra
note 11, at 250.
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also a risk that when incentives-based regulation appeals only to the selfinterest of financial industry personnel (for example, by subjecting their
bonuses to clawbacks if losses subsequently materialize),329 the penalties
involved can be interpreted simply as a “cost of doing business.”
Experimental studies have found that the introduction of penalties can
refocus individuals’ attention on those penalties, to the exclusion of any
concern for others that might have otherwise motivated their behavior.330
This Article therefore emphasizes the importance of supplementing
(and in some cases, substituting) incentives regulation and command-andcontrol regulation with policies that aim to maximize people’s natural
inclinations towards other-regarding behavior. The intention is not to
understate the importance of rules and incentives in engendering financial
stability—moral norms alone cannot regulate the financial system. Rather,
this Article asserts that policymakers should aim to calibrate a cocktail of
(i) command-and-control type rules, (ii) incentives and (iii) policies that
encourage indirect other-regarding behavior, in the way that seems best
calculated to engender financial stability. Part of this task entails
recognizing which type of tool is best suited to which type of problem;
norms of indirect other-regarding behavior are the best tool available for
addressing the pathologies of banking business as usual.
E. Market Discipline
Finally, it is worth briefly considering whether private market
discipline can play a role in circumscribing undesirable destabilizing
behaviors. Unfortunately, in the financial markets, self-interested market
discipline cannot force financial institutions to stop taking socially
undesirable risks: “the social costs of bank failure extend far beyond losses
to creditors,” and so even if market discipline worked perfectly, “the
contractual internalization of social costs would only be partial.”331 In
practice, because of creditor apathy and the opacity of financial institution
risk-taking, self-interested market discipline falls far short of achieving
even this theorized partial internalization.332 As such, purely self-interested
329. For an argument in favor of such clawbacks, see Brian Bell & John Van Reenen,
Bankers’ Bonuses: Claw-back Clauses Are Critical, VOXEU (May 3, 2010), available at
http://www.voxeu.org/article/bankers-bonuses-claw-back-clauses-are-critical.
330. See, e.g., Uri Gneezy & Aldo Rustichini, A Fine is a Price, 29 J. OF LEGAL STUD.
1 (2000) (discussing the effect of introducing a fine for parents who were late picking up
their children from day care; counterintuitively, this resulted in an increased number of late
collections); see also STOUT, supra note 11, at 191-92 (“By emphasizing external material
incentives, the day-care centers crowded out ‘internal’ incentives like guilt and empathy.”).
331. Armour & Gordon, supra note 199, at 14.
332. For a comprehensive discussion of the inability of market discipline to address
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actions in the financial markets fail to prevent widespread instability.
CONCLUSION
This Article has provided a nuanced exploration of the pathologies of
banking business as usual, and the moral and cognitive failures that drive
them. It has demonstrated that when financial stability is at stake, the
moral failure that must be addressed is a failure of indirect other-regarding
behavior, rather than the failure of honesty that the law is more accustomed
to addressing. Because neither criminal law nor private litigation are
appropriate for addressing failures of indirect other-regarding behavior
after the fact, and because it can sometimes be difficult for command-andcontrol regulation to prevent destabilizing activities ex ante, we are left
with the (somewhat dispiriting) conclusion that the maintenance of
financial stability sometimes rests on financial industry participants
choosing to care about the externalities of their actions.
It is thus vitally important that proponents of financial reform consider
ways of changing the prevailing Wall Street culture from one that is
governed entirely by norms of short-term self-interest, to one that is
tempered by norms of stewardship for financial stability. To date, attempts
to address industry culture have largely been restricted to structuring
incentives to align the industry’s self-interest with society’s interest in
financial stability. However, it can be very difficult to determine ex ante
the precise type of behavior that we want to incentivize and to tailor
incentives accordingly. As such, it is vital that the debate on financial
stability reform also be informed by the interdisciplinary research on otherregarding behavior that recognizes that in the right circumstances, people
will engage in other-regarding stability-minded behavior simply because
they view it as the right thing to do.
It may well be that true cultural change in the financial industry will
not be feasible until after the next financial crisis—but the industry must be
threatened with real reform then, or else it will have little impetus to
become more other-regarding, and we will find ourselves in an exacerbated
boom and bust cycle that disproportionately affects the most vulnerable
members of society. We should not have to wait for a crisis, however, to
implement the business education and governance reforms explored in this

systemic risk, see David Min, Understanding the Failures of Market Discipline, 42 WASH.
U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015). For these reasons, there seems to have been little by way of
discipline from bank creditors in the boom years leading up to the Financial Crisis. Anat
Admati et al., Fallacies, Irrelevant Facts, and Myths in the Discussion of Capital
Regulation: Why Bank Equity is Not Expensive 34 (Rock Ctr. for Corp. Governance at
Stanford Univ. Working Paper Series, No. 161,,2013).
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Article. These reforms are designed to improve the likelihood that
financial institutions will take a more proactively other-regarding stance,
and at least give some consideration to the potential externalities of their
activities.

